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This Article discusses the present contours of the
prohibition of crimes against humanity with reference to
proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia and deliberations at the
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court.
Because the contemporary status of this offense under
international law cannot be understood or appreciated
without reference to its history, this Article traces the
evolution of the concept of crimes against humanity with
particular reference to the genesis and re-interpretation
of the war nexus requirement. A recurrent theme in this
narrative is the search for an element of the offense
sufficient to distinguish crimes against humanity from
"ordinary" municipal crimes (e.g., murder, assault or
false imprisonment) and to justify the exercise of
international jurisdiction over inhumane acts that would
otherwise be the subject of domestic adjudication. The
war nexus originally served this purpose for the
Nuremberg architects, although the time-honored
doctrine of humanitarian intervention could have
provided adequate precedent for the international
prosecution of crimes against humanity. Recently, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia devised an ingenuous solution to the
problem of delimiting international jurisdiction and
distinguishing crimes against humanityfrom "ordinary"
crimes. The Trial Chamber did not require proof of a
substantial link between the defendant's inhumane act
and a state of war. Rather, the Chamber defined crimes
against humanity in terms of the mens rea of the
defendant and the existence of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population.
However, at the same time, the Tribunal added
additional elements to the definition of crimes against
humanity that further complicate the definition and the
* Attorney, The Center for Justice and Accountability. B.A. Stanford University; J.D.
Yale Law School. The author is indebted to Ruti Teitel, Ron Slye, Ryan Goodman, Derek
Jinks, and R. John Pritchard for their comments on this Article, and to Paul Kahn and Payam
Akhavan for their advice and assistance during the formative stage of this project. This
publication was supported in part by a grant from the Center on Crime, Communities & Culture
of the Open Society Institute.
HeinOnline  -- 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 787 1998-1999
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
Prosecution's burden ofproof Most recently, members
of the international community drafting the Statute for
the permanent International Criminal Court drew upon
the ICTY Statute and the work of the Tribunal in
drafting a consensus definition of crimes against
humanity that will govern prosecutions before the new
court. Fortunately, these drafters stopped where the
Trial Chamber should have. They defined crimes
against humanity with reference only to the existence of
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population and the mental state of the individual
defendant. In so doing, they recognized that once the
abuse of civilians surpasses a particular threshold, the
prescriptions of international law are activated and
individual perpetrators can be held internationally
liable for their acts of murder, assault or unlawful
detention. The evolving definition of crimes against
humanity since the Nuremberg era reveals the way in
which the principles guiding the contemporary
codification of international criminal law are
dramatically shifting. Such norms. were previously
drafted with an eye toward fortifying, or at least
defending, state sovereignty. Overtime, however, these
guiding principles have become more concerned with
condemning injurious conduct and guaranteeing the
accountability of individuals who subject others,
including their compatriots, to inhumane acts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although crimes against humanity are as old as humanity,' the
concept of a cognizable offense first surfaced in condemnations of the
massacres of the Armenians by what was then the Ottoman Empire2 and
other atrocities committed in World War I.3 After this brief but abortive
appearance, the juridical history of this offense really begins at
Nuremberg. The term "crimes against humanity" first appeared in
positive international law in Article 6(c) of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal (IMT), which defined crimes against
humanity as a constellation of prohibited acts committed against a
civilian population.4 The category of crimes against humanity was
added to the Charter because it was feared that under the traditional
formulation of war crimes, many of the defining acts of the Nazis would
go unpunished.' The crimes against humanity count in the Nuremberg
1. See Jean Graven, Les crimes contre l'humaniti, 76 RECUEIL DES COURS 472, 433
(1950).
2. See Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law:
The World War lArmenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L
L221, 280 (1989).
3. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement
of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29, 1919), 14 AM.
J. INT'LL. 95 (1920) [hereinafter Commission's Report].
4. The Charter defined crimes against humanity as "murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation
of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated." Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279
[hereinafter IMT Charter], reprinted in 1 TRIALS OFWAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at xii (1951) [hereinafter CCL
10 TRIALS]. The London Agreement was signed by the four major Allies and was then acceded
to by nineteen other states (Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece,
Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama,
Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia). Article 5(c) of the Charter for the
Tokyo Tribunal was substantially the same as Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, although it
omitted reference to persecutions on "religious grounds" and did not require the enumerated
acts to be "committed against any civilian population." See Special Proclamation by the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Jan. 19, 1946, art. V(c), T.I.A.S. No.
1589, 4 Bevans 20, 21, as amended Apr. 26, 1946, 4 Bevans 20, 27 [hereinafter Tokyo
Charter], reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 522,
523 (1975). The Tokyo Tribunal was not a multipartite forum created by international
agreement; rather, it was established pursuant to an Executive Decree of General Douglas
MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan acting under orders from
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Article 8 of the Tokyo Charter allowed any nation that had been
"at war" with Japan to appoint counsel to assist the tribunal's Chief of Counsel. Accordingly,
eleven nations participated in the prosecution: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Great Britain,
India, the United States, the Philippines, China, the Soviet Union, France, and the Netherlands.
5. Bert V.A. R6iling, The Nuremberg and the Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in 1 ATREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 590, 591 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds., 1973).
The inclusion of Article 6(c) reflected the desire of the Allies not to be restricted "to bringing
to justice those who had committed war crimes in the narrower sense.., but that also such
atrocities should be investigated, tried, and punished as have been committed on Axis territory
against persons of other than Allied nationality." Egon Schwelb, CrimesAgainst Humanity, 23
1999]
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Indictment encompassed acts committed by Nazi perpetrators against
German victims, who were thus of the same nationality as their
oppressors, or against citizens of a state allied with Germany.6 While
the crime of aggression-deemed "the greatest menace of our
times''7-was the centerpiece of the Charter and the Nuremberg Trial
(which was to be "the Trial to End All Wars"),8 the notion of crimes
BRIT. Y.B. OFINT'LL. 178, 183 (1946). The United States delegates to the IMT deliberations
defended the controversial conspiracy provisions of the Charter on this ground as well by
arguing that "there was 'no acceptable substitution for the [conspiracy] article as a means of
reaching any large numbers of persons' as well as of prosecuting atrocities committed by the
Nazis against German nationals." Stanislaw Pomorski, Conspiracy and Criminal Organization,
in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 213, 219 (G. Ginsburgs & V.N.
Kudriavstev eds., 1990).
6. Acts against these victims would not constitute war crimes, which are generally
defined in terms of prohibited acts directed toward the citizens, soldiers or property of an
adversary in an armed conflict. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and
Judgment, at 233, para. 619 (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997)
(noting that the Allies conceptualized crimes against humanity to include those "other serious
crimes that fall outside the ambit of traditional war crimes, such as where the victim is stateless,
has the same nationality as the perpetrator, or that of a state allied with that of the perpetrator"),
available at <http:llwww.un.org/icty/100895.htm>. See generally AKEHURST'S MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (Peter Malanczuk ed., 1997) (noting that the
Geneva Conventions are mainly concerned with the protection of individuals who find
themselves in enemy territory or who inhabit territory occupied by the enemy); Perry
Gulbrandsen, A Commentary on the Geneva Conventions ofAugust 12, 1949, in 1 A TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 368 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds., 1973).
7. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 99 (1947) [hereinafter IMT TRIALS]. At the time, the United States delegation in
particular viewed "belligerent militarism [as] ... the greatest threat and... the proximate cause
of the Nazis' other crimes." Simon Chesterman, NeverAgain... andAgain: Law, Order, and
the Gender of War Crimes in Bosnia and Beyond, 22 YALEJ. INT'LL. 299,318 (1997). Despite
this apparent hierarchy of crimes, a formal definition of "aggression" eluded the international
community until 1974. See Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). This definition later proved
unacceptable to delegates drafting the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. See
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5(2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17,
1998) (noting that the "Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 [amendments] and 123 [review of the
Statute] defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise
jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.") [hereinafter ICC Statute].
8. David Luban, The Legacies of Nuremberg, 54 Soc. RES. 779, 781 (1987). The
Nuremberg Tribunal conceived of the crime of aggression as encompassing all other crimes: "to
initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme
international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the
accumulated evil of the whole." Judgment of October 1, 1946, International Military Tribunal
Judgment and Sentence, 22 IMTTRIALS, supra note 7, at 498, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'LL.
172, 186 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment]. Indeed, a majority of the Nuremberg
Tribunal's judgment consists of describing the aggressive acts of Germany and the treaties
proscribing such aggression. See id. at 175-224. The notion of crimes against the peace was
the most controversial element of the Charter at the time. See F.B. Schick, The Nuremberg
Trial and the International Law of the Future, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 770, 783 (1947) ("Most
controversial among the broad legal aspect of the Nuremberg Trial is the basic concept that
aggressive war is not only illegal in international law but that those 'who plan and wage such
a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing.'")
(quoting Nuremberg Judgment); see also Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41
AM. J. INT'LL. 38, 62-67 (1947); George Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law,
41 AM. J. INT'LL. 20, 25-37 (1947).
[37:787
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against humanity has proven to be the real legacy of Nuremberg, albeit
with chronic definitional confusion.
The exercise of international jurisdiction over acts committedby
Germans against other Germans "must be considered a legal innovation
of first magnitude."9 The crimes against humanity charge confirmed
that citizens are under the protection of international law even when
they are victimized by their compatriots. 0 Furthermore, the criminality
of such acts "whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated"" established the supremacy of international
law over municipal law.'2 In this way, the prohibition of crimes against
humanity at Nuremberg had the potential to irretrievably pierce the trope
of sovereignty-"a rule of international law which provides that no state
shall intervene in the territorial and personal sphere of validity of
another national legal order."' 3
Despite this foundation for a new legal paradigm, the definition
of crimes against humanity in the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal contained a curious limiting principle: the Nuremberg Tribunal
could assert jurisdiction only over those crimes against humanity
committed "before or during the war" and "in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," i.e.,
war crimes or crimes against the peace. 4 This formulation became
known as the "war nexus," and it is apparent that the Charter's drafters
and the Nuremberg Tribunal itself considered the war nexus necessary
to justify the extension of international jurisdiction into what would
otherwise be acts within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. The war
nexus allowed the drafters of the Charter to condemn specific inhumane
acts of Nazi perpetrators committed within Germany without
threatening the entire doctrine of state sovereignty. Thus, Germany's
initiation of an aggressive war marked by systematic war crimes
9. Schick, supra note 8, at 785.
10. See Schwelb, supra note 5, at 178 (citing ALBERTDE LAPRADELLE, 2 NOUVELLEREV.
DROIT INT'L PRIVt (1946) (noting that crimes against humanity have been acclaimed as a
"revolution in international law")).
11. IMT Charter art. 6(c), supra note 4, at xi.
12. See Elisabeth Zoller, La Difinition des Crimes Contre L'humaniti, 120 J. DROrrINT'L
549, 552 (1993) ("Pour la premiere fois se faisait jour l'id~e qu'il y avait des actes 4 ce point
attentatoires A la dignit6 humaine que le fait qu'ils aient dt6 6xecut6s conformdment au droit
d'un Etat dtait un argument inop&ant.") ("For the first time, the idea emerged that there were
certain acts so detrimental to human dignity that the argument that they had been executed in
conformity with domestic law was ineffective.") (translation by author).
13. Schick, supra note 8, at 785. At the Nuremberg proceedings, the British prosecutor,
Sir Hartley Shawcross, acknowledged that "[n]ormally International Law concedes that it is for
the State to decide how it shall treat its own nationals; it is a matter of domestic jurisdiction."
Concluding Speeches by the Prosecution, 19 THE TRIAL OF THE GERMAN MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS, PROCEEDINGS OFTHE INTERNATIONALMILTARYTRIBUNALSrrTTINGATNUREMBERG
GERMANY 433 (1946). See also THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OFTHE NORNBERG TRIBUNAL:
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary-General) 43-44, 69-70
(1949).
14. Given this formulation, the term "crimes against humanity" has been likened to "an
accessory crime" or"a byproduct of war," designed for the protection of inhabitants of countries
in aggressive wars. Schwelb, supra note 5, at 206.
1999]
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provided the justification for the violation of its sovereignty entailed by
the inclusion of crimes against humanity within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the IMT Charter.
Since this inception, the definition of crimes against humanity
has been plagued by incoherence. 5 Unlike the international law
prohibitions against genocide 6 and war crimes, 7 the prohibition against
crimes against humanity did not become the subject of a comprehensive
multilateral convention until very recently."8 Without a consensus
definition, international tribunals, international law drafters and
commentators in the post-Nuremberg era were left to follow the
Nuremberg precedent in their treatment of the prohibition against crimes
against humanity. Accordingly, many of these subsequent
interpretations of the scope of the offense treated the war nexus
requirement as a substantive element of the offense that would have to
exist before the term "crimes against humanity" would apply to
inhumane acts that did not constitute war crimes,' 9 despite the fact that
the war nexus requirement could have been dismissed as ajurisdictional
element unique to the circumstances of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
15. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2585 (1991) ("[TIhe meaning of the term
[crimes against humanity] is shrouded in ambiguity.").
16. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
17. The four Geneva Conventions and their two Optional Protocols collectively proscribe
war crimes committed in international and internal armed conflicts. See Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 3 1; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, openedforsignature Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217,75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, openedforsignature Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
Protocol Addition to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
U.N. Doe. A/32/144, Annexes I, 11 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I, 11 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
18. See ICC Statute, supra note 7 (defining crimes against humanity). See also M. Cherif
Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity:" The Need for a Specialized Convention, 31 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'LL. 457 (1994).
19. See, e.g., Polyukovich v. Regina (Austr. 1992) 172 C.L.R. 501, paras. 45 (noting
argument by the Commonwealth that crimes of persecution and other serious crimes "must be
committed in the execution of or in connection with war or occupation to be a crime at
international law"), 70 (holding that "conduct which amounted to persecution on the relevant
grounds, or extermination of a civilian population, including a civilian population of the same
nationality as the offender, constituted a crime in international law only if it was proved that the
conduct was itself a war crime or was done in execution of or in connection with a war crime")
(Toohey J.); AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at
354 ("Crimes against humanity are wider than war crimes; they can be committed before a war
as well as during a war, and they can be directed against 'any civilian population,' including the
wrongdoing state's own population.").
[37:787
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Tribunals.2° At the same time, participants in subsequent trials and
codification efforts attempted to eliminate the war nexus requirement on
the grounds that it significantly limited the scope of the prohibition
against crimes against humanity by excluding comparable inhumane
acts committed in peacetime.2" These attempts met opposition from
other parties intent on halting the further erosion of state sovereignty
and fearful of elevating every peacetime crime to a crime against
humanity in violation of international law. Opponents of the war nexus
thus faced the challenge of devising another principle to distinguish
crimes against humanity from ordinary crimes and to justify the
application of international jurisdiction. The result was a hodgepodge
of definitions that did little to satisfy the principle of legality.22
20. See, e.g., Roger S. Clark, Crimes Against Humanity at Nuremberg, in THE
NUREMBERGTRIALANDINTERNATIONALLAW 177,195 (George Ginsburgs & V. N. Kudriavtsev
eds., 1990) (arguing that "[w]hat [the Nuremberg Tribunal] was concerned with was both a
much narrower question as to its own jurisdiction and a question as to what had been proved
in respect of the relationship between pre-1939 offenses and aggressive war."); TheodorMeron,
Editorial Comment, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 85 (1994) (suggesting that the war nexus "may have been guided by
jurisdictional considerations and not necessarily by a conceptually narrow definition of crimes
against humanity").
21. The war nexus requirement significantly limits the reach of the prohibition against
crimes against humanity with respect to violent situations that do not rise to the level of an
armed conflict, such as occurred in Latin America during the Cold War or in South Africa under
apartheid.
22. See, e.g., Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, annexed to Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. GAOR, May 19, 1993, U.N. Doc S/25704
(defining crimes against humanity as "the following crimes when committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: (a)
murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g)
rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane acts.")
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]; International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, art. 3, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1603 (1994) (defining crimes against humanity as "the
following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b)
Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h)
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) Other inhumane acts."); CAN. CRM.
CODE, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 7(3.76) (1985) (defining crimes against humanity as "murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission that
is committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of persons, whether or
not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at the time and in the place of its
commission, and that, at the time and in that place, constitutes a contravention of customary
international law or conventional international law or is criminal according to the general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations."); Fdd~ration Nationale Des
Ddport~s Et Internes Resistants Et Patriotes v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 124, 137 (1988) (Ct. de
Cassation, Crim. Chamber) (defining crimes against humanity as "inhumane acts and
persecution committed in a systematic manner in the name of a State practicing a policy of
ideological supremacy, not only against persons by reason of their membership of a racial or
religious community, but also against opponents of that policy, whatever the forms of their
opposition"); Touvier, CA Paris, 1988, 100 I.L.R. 341, 350-51 (holding that crimes against
humanity "must firstly form part of the execution of a common plan performed in the name of
a State practicing in a systematic manner a policy of ideological supremacy" and "must have
been committed against persons by reason of their belonging to a racial or religious group, or
1999]
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Given this trend toward the uncoupling of the prohibition of
crimes against humanity from a state of war, it was surprising that the
United Nations Security Council reproduced a version of the war nexus
when it drafted the Statute of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).23 The Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY, in the first contested case to come before it, affirmed the obiter
dicta of the Trial Chamber below and declared the war nexus to be a
jurisdictional element peculiar to the Nuremberg Charter and now to the
ICTY Statute as opposed to a substantive element of customary
international law.24 In its subsequent formulation of the prohibition
against crimes against humanity during the merits phase, the Trial
Chamber laid to rest some of the definitional confusion that had been
plaguing the concept of crimes against humanity since its inception."
The Trial Chamber did not require proof of a substantial link between
the defendant's inhumane act and a state of war. Rather, the Chamber
defined crimes against humanity in terms of the mens rea of the
defendant and the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against
a civilian population. In so holding, the Trial Chamber significantly
minimized the prosecutorial burden of proof with respect to the war
nexus in the Statute. At the same time, it cleverly resolved the problem
of the "hook" on which to hang international jurisdiction. However, the
Trial Chamber reversed this progressive trend and attached additional
elements to the prohibition against crimes against humanity. These
elements are not found in the Tribunal's Statute or elsewhere in
customary international law, and they significantly and unnecessarily
increase the Prosecution's burden of proof.
Most recently, members of the international community drafting
the Statute for the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) drew
upon the ICTY Statute and the work 'of the Tribunal in drafting the
definition of crimes against humanity that will govern prosecutions
before the new court.26 Fortunately, these drafters stopped where the
Trial Chamber should have. They defined crimes against humanity with
against opponents of that policy of ideological supremacy"); Final Report of the Commission
of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
Annex, at 27, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994) (Rwanda Commission of Experts) (defining
crimes against humanity as "gross violations of fundamental rules of humanitarian and human
rights law committed by persons demonstrably linked to a party to the conflict, as part of an
official policy based on discrimination against an identifiable group of persons, irrespective of
war and the nationality of the victim, and includes acts such as the following: Murder;
Extermination .. ."); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 247 (1992) (including state action and discriminatory intent as elements of
crimes against humanity).
23. ICTY Statute, supra note 22.
24. See Prosecution v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Decision on the Defence Motion, (Int'l
Crim. Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, Aug. 10, 1995), at 30; Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case
No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal in Jurisdiction
(Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., App. Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995), at 73. See also infra Part V.
25. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
formerYugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997); see infra Part V.
26. See ICC Statute, supra note 7, art. 7.
[37:787
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reference only to the existence of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population and the mental state of the individual
defendant. In so doing, they recognized that once the abuse of civilians
surpasses a particular threshold, the prescriptions of international law
are activated.
This Article discusses the present contours of the prohibition of
crimes against humanity with reference to proceedings before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
deliberations at the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. Because the
contemporary status of this offense under international law cannot be
understood or appreciated without reference to its history, this Article
traces the evolution of the concept of crimes against humanity with
particular reference to the genesis and re-interpretation of the war nexus
requirement. A recurrent theme in this narrative is the search for an
element of the offense sufficient to meaningfully distinguish crimes
against humanity from "ordinary" municipal crimes (e.g., murder,
assault, or false imprisonment) and to justify the extension of
international jurisdiction to inhumane acts that would otherwise be the
subject of domestic adjudication. The war nexus originally served this
purpose for the Nuremberg architects, although the time-honored
doctrine of humanitarian intervention could have provided adequate
precedent for the international prosecution of crimes against humanity.
The evolving definition of crimes against humanity since the Nuremberg
era reveals the way in which the principles guiding the contemporary
codification of international criminal law are dramatically shifting.
Such norms were previously drafted with an eye toward fortifying, or at
least defending, state sovereignty. Over time, however, these guiding
principles have become more concerned with condemning injurious
conduct and guaranteeing the accountability of individuals who subject
others, including their compatriots, to inhumane acts.
II. THE RooTs OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CRIMEs AGAINST
HuMANrrY
A. Precursors to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters
The so-called Martens Clause,27 which can be found in the 1907
Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and subsequent humanitarian law conventions, first articulated the
notion that international law encompassed transcendental humanitarian
27. The Martens Clause was named after the Russian delegate to the first Hague
Conference to address the laws of war.
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principles that existed beyond conventional law.28 This clause provides
that:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been
issued, the high contracting Parties deem it expedient to
declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles
of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity and the dictates of the public conscience. 9
The Allies invoked these "laws of humanity" after World War I in
connection with the proposed trials of war criminals from Germany and
its allies. In particular, the Turkish government's massacre of the
Armenian population prompted the Allied governments of France, Great
Britain and Russia to issue in 1915 a joint Declaration to the Ottoman
Empire denouncing these acts as "crimes against humanity and
civilization for which all the members of the Turkish Government will
be held responsible together with its agents implicated in the
massacres."
30
The Allied governments attending the Preliminary Peace
Conference of Paris in January 1919 formed a Commission on the
Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties
for Violations of the Law and Customs of War with representatives
from the "Great Powers"--the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, and Japan-and the lesser "Powers"-Belgium, Greece,
Poland, Romania, and Serbia-to report on violations of international
law committed in World War I and a procedure for trying such
offenses. 31 The majority of the Commission called for the establishment
of a Tribunal that would try "[all persons belonging to enemy countries,
however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank,
including Chiefs of State, who have been guilty of offences against the
laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity .... 32
28. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,36
Stat. 2277. The 1907 Hague Convention has its roots in many respects in an International
Military Commission staged on Crete in 1898 by the six Great Powers (Russia, France, Italy,
Great Britain, Germany, and Austria). These trials exercised jurisdiction over acts, such as the
massacre of Christian compatriots by Muslim Cretans, that would later be termed "crimes
against humanity." I am indebted to Dr. R. John Pritchard for this observation. See generally
R. John Pritchard, Gunboat Diplomacy, or The First Modem International Criminal Tribunal
for Crimes against Humanity: Thoughts on the National and International Military Commissions
on Crete 100 Years Ago (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
29. Id. at 2279-80.
30. Schwelb, supra note 5, at 181 (quoting Armenian Memorandum Presented by the
Greek Delegation to the Commission of Fifteen on Mar. 14, 1919).
31. See Commission's Report, supra note 3, at 95.
32. Id. at 117.
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The U.S. delegation (led by Robert Lansing and James Brown
Scott) dissented from this recommendation, however, insofar as such a
Tribunal would exercise jurisdiction over violations of the "laws of
humanity."33  It noted that the duty of the Commission was to
investigate violations or breaches of the laws and customs of war, not
violations of the laws or principles of humanity.34 The dissent
distinguished between moral and legal responsibilities and argued that
the former were not justiciable by an international tribunal regardless of
how iniquitous the challenged acts were. This dissent further explained
that:
The laws and customs of war are a standard certain, to
be found in books of authority and in the practice of
nations. The laws and principles of humanity vary with
the individual, which, if for no other reason, should
exclude them from consideration in a court of justice,
especially one charged with the administration of
criminal law.35
The U.S. position ultimately prevailed and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles
excluded reference to "crimes against humanity" in the relevant
provisions (Articles 228-30).36
The work of the Commission led to the insertion into the Peace
Treaty of S~vres of provisions calling for the trial by the Allied Powers
of Turkish war criminals accused of violating the laws and customs of
war and of engaging in the Armenian massacres on Turkish territory
during-but not before-the war. Notably, the terms "crimes against
humanity" and "laws of humanity" were not employed. 37 The Treaty
33. Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representatives of the United States
to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities (Apr. 4, 1919), Annex 2, reprinted in id.
at 127.
34. See id. at 133-34 ("[The report of the Commission does not, as in the opinion of the
American representative it should, confine itself to the ascertainment of the facts and to their
violation of the laws and customs of war, but going beyond the terms of the mandate, declares
that the facts found and acts committed were in violation of the laws and of the elementary
principles of humanity.").
35. Id. at 134.
36. See Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, reprinted in 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 151 (Supp.
1920), 16 AM. J. INT'LL. 207 (Supp. 1922). See generally Clark, supra note 20, at 178. The
proposed international tribunal to try German war criminals was never convened in part because
Germany refused to surrender German nationals to the Allies in repudiation of Article 228 of
the Versailles Treaty, and the Netherlands refused to surrender Kaiser Wilhelm II. Germany
did conduct national trials, the so-called Leipzig Trials, but the majority of defendants were
acquitted or their cases were dismissed. See generally Dadrian, supra note 2, at 315-17.
37. See Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of S~vres), Aug. 10, 1920
(unratified), reprinted at 15 AM.J. INT'LL. 179 (Supp. 1921). The Treaty was entered into by
the Allies (the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan but minus the United States), other
interested states (Armenia, Belgium, Greece, the Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia), and Turkey. See Dadrian, supra note 2, at 281; David Matas,
Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity: The Lessons of World War!, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
86,90 (1989-90).
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went unratified and never came into force. Its successor, the Treaty of
Lausanne, 8 was silent on the issue of criminal responsibility pursuant
to an accompanying Declaration of Amnesty for all offenses under
international law perpetrated between 1914-1922. 39  Although the
Allies-largely at the insistence of the United States
delegation-forsook the concept of crimes against humanity in the post-
World War I proceedings, they revived it in response to the atrocities of
World War .
B. The Prohibition Against Crimes Against Humanity Enters
Positive Law
The inclusion of the offense of crimes against humanity into the
Charter of the IMT was relatively uncontroversial, as there is little in the
drafting history to suggest opposition to its addition.4' The United
States delegation originally proposed that the subject matterjurisdiction
of the Tribunal be limited to violations of the customs and rules of
warfare, invasion by force, initiation of war, launching a war of
aggression, and recourse to war as an instrument of national policy."
In a reversal of the United States position on crimes against humanity
following World War I, this draft was soon supplemented to criminalize
in Article 12(b) acts committed before or during World War I that
resembled those acts that were eventually termed "crimes against
humanity": "Atrocities and offenses, including atrocities and
persecutions on racial or religious grounds, committed since 1 January
1933 in violation of any applicable provision of the domestic law of the
country in which committed."'42
The British delegates first proposed a precursor to the war nexus
in Article 12: "Atrocities and persecutions and deportations on political,
racial or religious grounds, in pursuance of the common plan or
enterprise referred to in sub-paragraph (d) hereof whether or not in
38. Treaty of Lausanne, 28 L.N.T.S. 12, reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'LL. I (Supp. 1924).
39. Id. (providing that a "[f]ull and complete amnesty shall be respectively granted to the
Turkish Government and by the Greek Government for all crimes or offences committed during
the same period which were evidently connected with the political events which have taken
place during that period."). See BASSIOUNI, supra note 22, at 175; see also Matas, supra note
37, at 92. In lieu of an international tribunal, the Turkish government undertook domestic trials
in 1919-1921 under relevant provisions of its penal codes. See generally Dadrian, supra note
2, at 291-317.
40. This is in stark contrast to the hostile reception accorded the United States proposal
to include jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and the common plan to wage war.
41. American Draft of Definitive Proposal, Presented to Foreign Ministers at San
Francisco, April 1945, reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIBUNALS 22, doc. IV
(1945) [hereinafter JACKSON REPORT].
42. Revision of American Draft of Proposed Agreement, June 14, 1945, reprinted in
JACKSON REPORT, supra note 41, at 55, 57, doc. IX, I 12(b).
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violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated."'43
Subsequent French4 and British45 drafts did not include the language of
the war nexus, whereas a Soviet draft removed reference to this category
of crimes altogether.46
Justice Robert H. Jackson of the United States delegation argued
for language that linked the prosecution of civilian atrocities to the
prosecution of the "common plan" on the grounds that such a
connection was necessary to justify the activation of international
jurisdiction:
It has been a general principle of foreign policy of our
Government from time immemorial that the internal
affairs of another government are not ordinarily our
business; that is to say, the way Germany treats its
inhabitants ... is not our affair any more than it is the
affair of some other government to interpose itself in our
problems. The reason that this program of
extermination of Jews and destruction of the rights of
minorities becomes an international concern is this: it
was a part of a plan for making an illegal war. Unless
we have a war connection as a basis for reaching them,
I would think we have no basis for dealing with
atrocities. They were apart of the preparation for war or
for the conduct of the war in so far as they occurred
inside of Germany and that makes them our concern.47
43. Amendments Proposed by the United Kingdom, June 28,1945, reprinted in JACKSON
REPORT, supra note 41, at 86, 87, doc. XIV, I 3(e). In keeping with the United States proposal,
sub-paragraph (d) criminalized: "Entering into a common plan orenterprise aimed at aggression
against, or domination over, other nations, which plan or enterprise included or intended, or was
reasonably calculated to involve or in its execution did involve, the use of unlawful means for
its accomplishment, including any or all of the acts set out in subparagraphs (a) to (c) above
[violations of the laws or customs of war, launching a war of aggression, invasion] or the use
of a combination of such unlawful means with other means." Id. I 3(d).
44. See Draft Article on Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by French Delegation, July 19,
1945, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 41, at 293, doc. XXXV (providing jurisdiction
over any person who directed the preparation and conduct of: "(i) the policy of aggression
against, and of domination over, other nations, carried out by the European Axis Powers in
breach of treaties and in violation of international law; (ii) the policy of atrocities and
persecutions against civilian populations; (iii) the war, launched and waged contrary to the laws
and customs of international law; and who is responsible for the violations of international law,
the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience, committed by the armed forces
and civilian authorities in the service of those enemy Powers").
45. See Proposed Revision of Definition of "Crimes" (Article 6), Submitted by British
Delegation, July 20, 1945, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 41, at 312, doc. XXXIX.
46. See Redraft of Definition of"Crimes," Submitted by Soviet Delegation, July 23, 1945,
reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 41, at 327, doc. XLIII.
47. Minutes of Conference Session of July 23,1945, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra
note 41, at 328, 331, doc. XLIV. Justice Jackson further explained, "We think it is justifiable
that we interfere or attempt to bring retribution to individuals or to states only because the
concentration camps and the deportations were in pursuance of a common plan or enterprise of
making an unjust or illegal war in which we became involved. We see no other basis on which
we arejustified in reaching the atrocities which were committed inside Germany, under German
law, or even in violation of German law, by authorities of the German state. Without
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Professor Gros of the French delegation objected to this requirement and
noted that there have been many interventions for humanitarian reasons
unrelated to acts of aggression.48 He also noted the burden such a
requirement would place on the Prosecution:
I think that it puts on us an obligation to prove that those
persecutions were inflicted in pursuit of aggression and
that is a difficult burden because, even in the Nazi plan
against the Jews, there is no apparent aggression against
other nations. Paragraph (a) speaks of aggression over
other nations; so it would be easy for German counsel to
submit to the court that the Nazis' plan against the Jews
is a purely internal matter without any relation
whatsoever to aggression as the text stands.49
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe of the British delegation countered that it
would not be difficult to associate the anti-Jewish measures with the
general plan of aggression. ° The French delegates apparently did not
pursue their objections, and all subsequent drafts, including the French
ones, included language that linked the prosecution of atrocities against
civilian populations to either the launching of aggressive war or to the
common plan provision.5 ' With respect to one such draft, Justice
substantially this definition, we would not think we had any part in the prosecution of those
things which I agree with the Attorney-General are absolutely necessary in this case." Id. at
333.
48. See Minutes of Conference Session of July 24, 1945, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 41, at 360, doe. XLVII.
49. Id. at 361.
50. See id. at 362. In his summation, the British Chief Prosecutor Sir Hartley Shawcross
explained that "'the crime against the Jews, insofar as it is a crime against humanity and not a
war crime as well, is one which we indict because of its close association with the crime against
the peace. That is, of course, a very important qualification on the Indictment of the Crimes
against Humanity which is not always appreciated by those who have questioned the exercise
of this jurisdiction. But subject to that qualification we have thought it right to deal with
matters which the criminal law of all countries would normally stigmatize as crimes-murder,
extermination .... These things done against belligerent nationals, or for that matter, done
against German nationals in belligerent occupied territory would be ordinary war crimes the
prosecution of which would form no novelty. Done against others they would be crimes against
municipal law except insofar as German law, departing from all the canons of civilized
procedure, may have authorized them to be done .... [T]he nations adhering to the Charter of
this Tribunal have felt it proper and necessary in the interest of civilization to say that these
things even if done in accordance with the laws of the German State... were, when committed
with the intention of affecting the international community-that is in connection with the other
crimes charged-not mere matters of domestic concern but crimes against the law of nations."
Concluding Speeches by the Prosecution, 19 THE TRIAL OF THE GERMAN MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS, PROCEEDINGS OFTHE INTERNATIONALM IuITARY TRIBUNAL SrITING AT NUREMBERG
471 (1948).
51. See, e.g., Redraft of Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by Soviet Delegation, July 25,
1945, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 41, at 373, doc. XLVIII; Redraft of Definition
of"Crimes," Submitted by American Delegation, July 25, 1945, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 41, at 374, doe. XLIX; Revised Definition of "Crimes," Prepared by British
Delegation and Accepted by French Delegation, July 28, 1945, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 41, at 390, doe. LII; Revised Definition of"Crimes," Prepared by British Delegation
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Jackson noted that "we should insert words to make clear that we are
reaching persecution, etc. of Jews and others in Germany as well as
outside of it, and before as well as after commencement of the war."52
In other words, he did not anticipate that crimes against humanity would
be prosecuted only if they were committed following the formal
commencement of war. After much contentious debate over the
inclusion of the crimes of aggression and the common plan, the United
States delegation proposed a revised Article 6 that was finally accepted
by the other delegates. 3 This marks this first time that the term "crimes
against humanity" was employed in the drafting process.
This precise formulation did not appear in the final version of
the Charter; rather the Charter contained a slight discrepancy in
punctuation. 4 The French- and English-language versions of the IMT
Charter contained semicolons between the two broad categories of
crimes against humanity--enumerated inhumane acts and persecutions
on specified grounds. In other words, the English version read: "and
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before
or during the war; or persecutions... in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal . . . ."" This
formulation implied that the "war nexus" was relevant only for the
second broad category of crime: persecution-related crimes. The
Russian-language text, like the United States proposal,56 contained a
comma that applied the war nexus to both categories of crimes. By the
Berlin Protocol of October 6, 1945,"' the semicolons that had originally
appeared in the equally authentic English and French versions of the text
were replaced by the comma from the Russian version.5 8 As such, the
caveat, "in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal," applied to both sets of acts-inhumane
acts and persecutions-and gave rise to the war nexus as it is known
today.59
to Meet Views of Soviet Delegation, July 28, 1945, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra note
41, at 392, doc. LIII.
52. Notes on Proposed Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by American Delegation, July
31, 1945, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 41, at 394, doc. LV, 4.
53. See Revision of Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by American Delegation, July 31,
1945, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 41, at 395, doc. LVI (granting the IMT
jurisdiction over "Crimes Against Humanity, namely, murder[,] extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, religious grounds, in furtherance of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated").
54. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 41, at 422, doc. LX.
55. Id. at 423, art. 6(c).
56. See supra note 53.
57. Protocol to Agreement and Charter, October 6, 1945, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 41, at 429, doc. LXI.
58. See Schwelb, supra note 5, at 194.
59. See id. at 192-95. As originally drafted, the Tokyo Charter contained the comma as
opposed to the semi-colon. See Tokyo Charter, supra note 4.
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While this substitution did not alter the English text
considerably, it did require substantial amendment to the French text.6°
The original text had defined crimes against humanity as:
l'assassinat . . . et tout autre acte inhumain commis
contre toutes populations civiles, avant ou pendant la
guerre; ou bien les pers6cutions pour des motifs
politiques, raciaux ou religieux, commises la suite de
tout crime rentrant dans la comp6tence du Tribunal
international ou s'y rattachant, que ces persecutions aient
constitu6 ou non une violation du droit interne du pays
oti elles ont 6 perp6tr6es.6'
This definition clearly indicates that the war nexus applied only to acts
of persecution and not to the first category of crimes against
humanity-inhumane acts. After the Protocol, the text read:
l'assassinat . . . et tout autre acte inhumain commis
contre toutes populations civiles, avant ou pendant la
guerre, ou bien les pers6cutions pour des motifs
politiques, raciaux ou religieux, lorsque ces actes ou
pers6cutions, qu'ils aient constitu6 ou non une violation
du droit interne du pays oti ils ont 6t6 perp6tr6s, ont 6t6
commis h la suite de tout crime rentrant dans la
comp6tence du Tribunal, ou en liaison avec ce crime.6'
The source of the semi-colon in the French and English texts apparently
remains a mystery. An unsatisfyingly simple explanation is that there
was a punctuation error in the text.63 At the same time, it has been
60. See Zoller, supra note 12, at 555 (emphasizing the radical change in the French text
wrought by the Berlin Protocol).
61. "Assassination . . . and all other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war; or acts of persecution for political, racial or religious
motives, committed in connection with any other crime included within the competence of the
International Tribunal, regardless of whether or not these acts of persecution constituted a
violation of the internal law of the country in which they were committed." (translation by
author).
62. "Assassination . . . and all other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war, or acts of persecution for political, racial or religious
motives, when these inhumane acts or acts of persecution, regardless of whether they constituted
a violation of the internal law of the country in which they were committed, are committed
following any other crime contained within the competence of the International Tribunal, or in
connection with such a crime." (translation by author). See THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF
THENORNBERGTRIBUNAL: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary-
General) 66 (1949).
63. See G.I.A.D. Draper, The Modern Pattern of War Criminality, 6 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 9, 19 (1976) ("Originally there had been a semi-colon at that point of the text, but this
semi-colon, having been discovered by the USSR to be a textual error, was replaced by a
comma."). See generally Clark, supra note 20, at 191-92 (suggesting that perhaps "an error was
simply made").
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acknowledged that "the nagging doubt remains that something more
substantive was going on and that there had been a change of
position."' 4 The pre-Protocol French text in particular suggested that
the tribunal was to exert jurisdiction over inhumane acts regardless of
their connection to war-the French position at the outset of the
deliberations.65
C. The Nuremberg Tribunal's Restrictive Treatment of Crimes
Against Humanity
The IMT Charter thus defined crimes against -humanity in
reference to the other two crimes to be prosecuted by the Nuremberg
Tribunal: crimes against the peace66 and war crimes.67 While the
Charter's language is not ambiguous on this point,68 the Tribunal
generally, although not exclusively as shall be seen, limited the
prosecution of crimes against humanity to those acts perpetrated after
war had been officially declared.69 In this way, the Tribunal virtually
negated the phrase "before or during the war" and limited the
application of the prohibition against crimes against humanity even
more than the Charter's drafters.7" Despite the articulation of this
64. Clark, supra note 20, at 192.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
66. Crimes against the peace were defined at Article 6(a) as: "planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing." IMT Charter, supra note 4, art. 6(a), at xi.
67. Article 6(b) defined war crimes as:
violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but
not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for
any other purpose of a civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing
of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
Id. art. 6(b), atxi.
68. Note that the text reads that crimes against humanity are those "inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war." See Schick, supra note
8, at 787 (emphasis added).
69. Note that this limited interpretation was apparently contrary to Justice Jackson's
interpretation of the text of the Charter. See supra text accompanying note 52.
70. The "Fribunal, regrettably perhaps, and in clear disregard of the Charter, decided to
interpret crimes against humanity restrictively, limiting itself to those committed after 1939, and
so assimilating them to the less controversial charge of war crimes." JUDITH SHKLAR,LEGAUSM
165 (1964). According to Donnedieu de Vabres, the Frenchjudge at Nuremberg, "the category
of crimes against humanity which the Charter had let enter by a very small door evaporated by
virtue of the Tribunal's judgment." HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 257 (1963),
quoting M. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LE PROCtS DE NUREMBERG (1947). "It is not clear from
the reasoning of the Tribunal, in view of its previous holding that it was bound by the Charter
as the law of the case, why it felt free to disregard the express terms of the Charter on this
particular definition." Finch, supra note 8, at 23. See also Wright, supra note 8, at 61-62 ("The
Tribunal might have found that some of the acts before [November 1937, when the plans for
waging aggressive war were laid] were war crimes or crimes against humanity in the sense of
the Charter. Its refusal to do so seems to have manifested its prevailing disposition to give the
defendants the benefit of any doubt.").
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apparently steep threshold, in practice the Tribunal did not require proof
of a tight nexus between the acts charged and the war.
In evaluating the crimes against humanity count, the Nuremberg
Tribunal held broadly that the majority of inhumane acts perpetrated
prior to the formal declaration of war did not constitute crimes against
humanity in that it had not been proven that they satisfied the
requirements of the war nexus in the Charter.
To constitute Crimes against Humanity, the acts relied
on before the outbreak of the war must have been in
execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the
opinion that revolting and horrible as many of these
crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved that
they were done in execution of, or in connection with,
any such crime. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a
general declaration that the acts before 1939 were
Crimes against Humanity within the meaning of the
Charter, but from the beginning of the war in 1939, War
Crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also
Crimes against Humanity; and insofar as the inhumane
acts charged in the Indictment, and committed after the
beginning of the war, did not constitute War Crimes,
they were all committed in execution of, or in
connection with, the aggressive war, and therefore
constituted Crimes against Humanity.
7
'
In other words, enumerated acts committed prior to September 1, 1939,
the date Germany invaded Poland, "could not constitute crimes against
humanity ... no matter how 'revolting or horrible' they were" because
it has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of,
or in connection with any such crime.72
71. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 8, at 249. Indeed, the judgment aggregated the
verdicts of the defendants with respect to the war crimes and crimes against humanity counts
and it is often difficult to determine precisely which acts constitute war crimes and which
constitute crimes against humanity. See, e.g., id. at 273-275 (reciting Hermann Gring's
crimes), 279-80 (same for Joachim von Ribbentrop), 282-83 (Wilhelm Keitel); 284-85 (Ernst
Kaltenbrunner), 287-88 (Alfred Rosenberg), 289-90 (Hans Frank), etc.
72. Leila S. Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court
of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'LL 289,308
(1994) (quoting IMT Judgment). Wexler observes that the time when a crime was committed
is not alone decisive, the connexion [sic] with the war must be established in order to bring a
certain set of facts under the notion of a crime against humanity within the meaning of Article
6(c). See id. The British Prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, explained in his closing
arguments: "You have to be satisfied not only that what was done was a crime against humanity
but also that it was not purely a domestic matter, but that directly or indirectly it was associated
with crimes against other nations or other nationals, in that, for instance, it was undertaken in
order to strengthen the Nazi Party in carrying out its policy of domination by aggression, or to
remove elements such as political opponents, the aged, the Jews, the existence of whom would
have hindered the carrying out of the total war policy." Concluding Speeches by the
Prosecution, 19 THE TRIAL OF THE GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
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Of the twenty-two indicted Nazi leaders, nineteen were
convicted,73 of which two were found guilty only of crimes against
humanity (Julius Streicher and B aldur von Schirach).74 Notwithstanding
the Tribunal's affirmation-and even heightening-of the war nexus
requirement, there were times when the connection between the acts of
defendants convicted of crimes against humanity and other crimes
against the peace or war crimes was "juridically fragile."'75 In addition,
the restrictive interpretation of the war nexus was relaxed with respect
to non-German victims. Crimes against Austrian nationals committed
before the war satisfied the requirement introduced by the war nexus
because they were perpetrated while Austria was annexed by Germany,
an act that constituted a crime against the peace under the Charter. For
example, with respect to von Schirach, indicted under Counts One
(conspiracy) and Four (crimes against humanity) but convicted under
Count Four alone,76 the Tribunal reasoned:
Austria was occupied pursuant to a common plan of
aggression[, so i]ts occupation is, therefore 'a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal' .... As a result,
'murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts' and 'persecutions on political,
racial, or religious grounds' in connection with this
occupation constitute a Crime against Humanity.77
Likewise, Constatin von Neurath was convicted of crimes against
humanity on the basis of his activities in Czechoslovakia before
September 1, 1939.78
Similarly, Streicher was indicted on Counts One and Four, but
acquitted on Count One. With respect to Count Four, he was accused
of writing, speaking, and preaching hatred of the Jews and inciting
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG GERMANY 433 (1946).
73. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, Franz von Papen, and Hans Fritzsche were acquitted.
Martin Bormann was tried and convicted in absentia. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 8,
at 331-32. Twenty-eight Japanese leaders were indicted for all three crimes within the Tokyo
Charter (the Charter did not criminalize organizations as the Nuremberg Charter had) and
twenty-five of the defendants were convicted (the cases against three defendants were dismissed
because two were declared "unfit" and one died). The Judgment focuses on the crimes against
the peace charges and largely passes over the other counts that were not dismissed. See
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment, pt. C, ch. IX, at 1143-44 (1948). See
generally RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR'S JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1971).
74. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 8, at 547-49 (Streicher); id. at 563-66 (von
Schirach).
75. Zoller, supra note 12, at 554 (translation by author).
76. The tribunal acquitted von Schirach under Court 1 on the grounds that he was not
sufficiently involved in the planning or preparation of the war of aggression. See Nuremberg
Judgment, supra note 8, at 310.
77. Id.; see also id. at 318-21 (finding Arthur Seyss-Inquart similarly guilty under Count
4).
78. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 8, at 325-26 (finding von Neurath guilty under
Count 4).
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people to active persecution and extermination. The Tribunal concluded
simply that "Streicher's incitement to murder and extermination at the
time when Jews in the East were being killed under the most horrible
conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds
in connection with War Crimes, as defined by the Charter, and
constitutes a Crime against Humanity., 79 No other support for the
presence of a war nexus was provided.
This review of the record reveals that the Tribunal was satisfied
by evidence of a merely tenuous connection between the acts alleged to
be crimes against humanity and the war. Furthermore, as observed by
a later United Nations commentary, the Tribunal assumed that "although
an inhumane act, to constitute a crime against humanity, must be
connected with a crime against peace or with a war crime, the required
connexion [sic] can exist even when the crime against peace or the war
crime was committed by another person, 80 as was the case with
defendant Streicher. In fact, although the Nuremberg judges may have
limited and even downplayed the crimes against humanity charge, all
those sentenced to hang were found guilty of crimes against humanity.
In contrast, the defendants found guilty of waging aggressive war were
accorded life sentences,8 even though the Tribunal had indicated that
"to initiate a war of aggression is the supreme international crime,
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the
accumulated evil of the whole."82 Thus, the judges "revealed their true
sentiment by meting out their most severe punishment, the death
penalty, only to those who had been found guilty of those quite
uncommon atrocities that actually constituted a 'crime against
humanity."' 83
79. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 8, at 134.
80. THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OFTHE NURNBERG TRIBUNAL HISTORY AND ANALYSiS
(Memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General) 69 (1949).
81. See Wright, supra note 8, at 41.
82. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 8, at 186.
83. ARENDT, supra note 70, at 257. An alternative explanation for this sentencing
phenomenon turns on the nature and consequences of the crimes:
Though aggressive war may result in larger losses of life, property and
social values than any other crime, yet the relationship of the acts
constituting the crime to such losses is less close than in the case of crime
[sic] against humanity. The latter implies acts indicating a direct
responsibility for large-scale homicide, enslavement or deportation of
innocent civilians.... The crime of aggressive war... may lead to large-
scale hostilities and serious losses but they may, on the other hand, succeed
or be suppressed without serious damage.
Wright, supra note 8, at 44. This presumed hierarchy of crimes appears in ICTY jurisprudence.
See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., App. Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997), at
17, para. 21 ("It is in their very nature that crimes against humanity differ in principle from war
crimes. Whilst rules proscribing war crimes address the criminal conduct of a perpetrator
towards an immediate protected object, rules proscribing crimes against humanity address the
perpetrator's conduct not only towards the immediate victim but also towards the whole of
humankind."). But see Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Li (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., App. Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997), at 10-16,
para. 19-27 (arguing that crimes against humanity are not more serious than war crimes); see
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In this way, it is apparent that the Nuremberg Charter drafters
considered the war nexus requirement to be essential to justify the
international adjudication of acts that would otherwise be within the
jurisdictional sphere of Germany.'" The Nuremberg Tribunal further
limited the reach of the crimes against humanity charge to those acts
perpetrated after the formal commencement of war, despite the clear
intent of the Charter's drafters. The strength of this precedent was to
influence subsequent trials of lesser defendants in the occupied zones,
even though the constitutive document is silent as to the war nexus
requirement.
Il. THE NUREMBERG PROGENY: SUBSEQUENT CRIMEs AGAINST
HUMANITY TRIALS
The next major codification of the prohibition of crimes against
humanity appeared in Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL 10)5 enacted
by the Allied Control Council of Germany 6 almost immediately after
the promulgation of the IMT Charter "[iln order to give effect to the
terms of the... London Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the Charter
also id. at 10, para. 19 ("The gravity of a criminal act and consequently the seriousness of its
punishment, are determined by the intrinsic nature of the act itself and not by its classification
under one category or another.").
84. Some commentators have argued that the war nexus requirement was more a response
to the desire to remain faithful to the principle of legality-nullum crimen sine lege, nullapoena
sine lege. According to this theory, the war nexus implied that the prohibition of crimes against
humanity was a corollary of, or at most a mere incremental innovation to, the prohibition of war
crimes, an already well-developed corpus of law. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 22, at 186
(opining that the war nexus requirement was devised in order "to strengthen its legality by
connecting it to the more established notion of war crimes. Thus, by foregoing prosecution for
crimes committed between 1933 and the advent of war in 1939, the framers of the Charter most
likely believed that it would strengthen the prosecution's legal case for post-1939
criminalization."); SHKLAR, supra note 70, at 162 (noting that to the drafters of the IMT
Charter, the charge of war crimes was familiar and based upon a tradition of written
instruments). Yet this explanation does not fully account for the resilience of the war nexus the
beyond the Nuremberg era. Furthermore, it implies that the concept of crimes against humanity
was about repackaging the same offenses under a different rubric. What was truly revolutionary
about the concept of crimes against humanity was that while the prohibited acts ("murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts") do not differ substantially
from traditional war crimes, the class of victims who are protected by the two prohibitions does
differ significantly.
85. Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against the Peace and Against Humanity, art. 11(c), (1945) [hereinafter CCL 10], reprinted in
1 CCL 10 TRIAlS, supra note 4, at xvi, xvii..
86. The Allied Control Council was composed of authorized representatives from the four
Powers, viz., the former U.S.S.R., the U.S., Great Britain, and France. Pursuant to the Potsdam
Declaration, the governments of the four Powers assumed the responsibility of administering
the German State. See Schick, supra note 8, at 780 ('The legal consequence of the Potsdam
Declaration was that Germany as an independent state ceased to exist... [and] the whole
legislative, judicial, and executive rights formerly possessed by the German Government are
vested in the Control Council."). In other words, the German government "went out of
existence" upon the unconditional surrender of Germany. As such, the sovereignty of Germany
was being "held in trust by the condominium of the occupying powers." Finch, supra note 8,
at 22.
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issued pursuant thereto and in order to establish a uniform legal basis in
Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar
offenders other than those dealt with in the International Military
Tribunal. ' 7 CCL 10 did not incorporate the war nexus88 when it
defined crimes against humanity as:
Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the
country where perpetrated.89
The legislative history of CCL 10 is sparse, so the intent of its drafters
in excluding reference to the war nexus remains unclear. It may have
been that its drafters in the Control Council considered the Law to be
German domestic law, to be administered by local courts,' without
87. CCL 10, supra note 85, pmbl., reprinted in 1 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at xvi.
88. The absence of the war nexus requirement prompted one commentator to posit at the
time that crimes against humanity were no longer linked to a state of war. See Schwelb, supra
note 5, at 218 ("The whole jurisprudence evolved in the Nuremberg proceedings with a view
to restricting crimes against humanity to those closely connected with the war becomes
irrelevant for the courts which are dealing or will be dealing with crimes against humanity under
Law No. 10."). This position finds support in contemporary commentaries notwithstanding
contrary jurisprudence by the post-Nuremberg tribunals. See Meron, supra note 20, at 85
(concluding that CCL 10 "deleted the jurisdictional nexus between war crimes and crimes
against the peace... [such] that crimes against humanity exist independently of war").
89. CCL 10, supra note 85, art. 11(c).
90. The Prosecution in the Flick case emphasized CCL 1 O's character as an "occupational
enactment" in its attempt to apply the crimes against humanity provision to acts occurring prior
to the formal declaration of war. See United States v. Flick, Opening Statement for the
Prosecution, 6 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 3, 84. Later, however, the Prosecution
characterized the Military Tribunal before which it was arguing as "an international tribunal."
Id. at 90. The characterization of CCL 10 by another tribunal was ambiguous on this point. See
United States v. Altstoetter, Opinion and Judgment, 3 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 954,
965-66 (noting that CCL 10 "is an exercise of supreme legislative power in and for Germany.
It does not purport to establish by legislative act any new crimes of international applicability.
...[Likewise,] C. C. Law 10 may be deemed to be a codification rather than original
substantive legislation. Insofar as C. C. Law 10 may be thought to go beyond established
principles of international law, its authority, of course, rests upon the exercise of the 'sovereign
legislative power' of the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered.");
but see id. at 1213 ("he Nurenberg [sic] Tribunals [under CCL 10] are not German courts..
.On the contrary, the jurisdiction of this Tribunal rests on international authority .... [It]
enforces international law as superior in authority to any German statute or decree."); id. at 964
("The fact that C. C. Law 10 on its face is limited to the punishment of German criminals does
not transform this Tribunal into a German court."). Subsequent judicial pronouncements have
treated CCL 10 as an international instrument. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-
22-A, Judgment, Separate and Dissenting Opinion ofJ. Cassese (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo.,
App. Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997), para. 27 ("[A]s Control Council Law No. 10 can be regarded as
an international instrument among the four Occupying Powers (subsequently transformed, to
a large extent, into customary law), the action of the courts establishing or acting under that Law
acquires an international relevance that cannot be attributed to national courts pronouncing
solely on the strength of national law.").
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international legal ramifications9". Accordingly, concerns for respecting
the doctrine of sovereignty were perhaps less pressing, because the
Control Council as "trustee"' of German sovereignty could "consent"
to the violation of sovereignty entailed by the crimes against humanity
provisions in CCL 10.'
This law was to form the basis for prosecutions of non-major
defendants' conducted by the Allies in their respective zones of
occupation and in the vicinity of the alleged crimes. For example, under
CCL 10, the United States prosecuted twelve cases involving Nazi
military and civilian leaders, German industrialists, and other
offenders.95 Several of these proceedings addressed the war nexus
requirement. Two tribunals interpreted the terms of the Law literally
and announced that crimes against humanity could be perpetrated and
prosecuted independent of a state of war.96 However, the legal weight
to be accorded these determinations is unclear given that they were
arguably mere obiter dicta. The trials that directly addressed the issue
adhered to the Nuremberg precedent and incorporated the war nexus
requirement into the definition of crimes against humanity in CCL 10.'
These tribunals and the occasional defense counsel justified this
departure from the text of CCL 10 on the force of the Nuremberg
precedent and the need to maintain a distinction between crimes against
humanity and ordinary domestic crimes.
The tribunal in the so-called Einsatzgruppen Case, brought
against commanders of the killing squads that were responsible for
killing millions of Jews and other "undesirables," reasoned that the
"Allied Control Council, in its Law No. 10, removed this limitation [the
war nexus] so that the present Tribunal has jurisdiction to try all crimes
against humanity as long known and understood under the general
91. This characterization is shared by some commentators. See BASSIOUNI,supra note 22,
at 35 (noting that CCL 10 "was not intended to be an international instrument but national
legislation").
92. See supra note 86.
93. In contrast, the IMT Charter served as the constitutive instrument of an international
judicial organ administering international law-so that its jurisdiction in "administering
international law, and therefore itsjurisdiction in domestic matters of Germany [was] cautiously
circumscribed." Schwelb, supra note 5, at 218.
94. The Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943 declared that the majority of German
war criminals would be tried within the countries in which they perpetrated their crimes, but the
major war criminals would be punished by joint action of the Allies. See Leo Gross, The
Punishment of War Criminals: The Nuremberg Trial, in LEO GROSS, SELECTED ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONALLAW AND ORGANIZATION 133,137 (1993). Accordingly, the Charter provided
that the Tribunal was to try those major war criminals "whose offenses have no particular
geographic location." IMT Charter, supra note 4, at viii.
95. See generally Willard Cowles, Trials of War Criminals (Non-Nuremberg), 42 Am. J.
INT'L L. 299 (1948); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OFTHE NUREMBERG TRiALs (1992).
96. See United States v. Ohlendorf, Opinion and Judgment, 4 CCL 10TRIALS, supra note
4, at 411; United States v. Altstoetter, Judgment, 3 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 954.
97. See United States v. Flick, Judgment, 6 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 3; United
States v. von Weizsaecker, 12 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 118.
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principles of criminal law."9' As such, "this law [prohibiting crimes
against humanity] is not restricted to events of war. It envisions the
protection of humanity at all times."99 This holding must be regarded
as obiter dicta, however, given that the indictment charged only actions
committed between May 1941 and July 1943, well after the
commencement of war. 10o
The Justice Case'01 involved various German jurists who were
charged with the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, t2
and with conspiring to commit such offenses 3 through the
instrumentalities of the German Ministry of Justice and courts.
Although the Tribunal observed that CCL 10 "differs materially from
the Charter," in that, in the former, the war nexus was "deliberately
omitted from the definition" of crimes against humanity,"° all of the
acts alleged under Count Two (crimes against humanity) of the
indictment were committed after September 1939, so the legal weight
attributable to this observation is unclear. Count One (common plan)
of the Indictment did, however, allege acts committed prior to this time.
Upon dismissing this Count on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction to try
any defendant upon a charge of conspiracy as a separate substantive
offense,0 5 the Tribunal observed that Count One may contain residual
charges which could still be pursued:
98. United States v. Ohlendorf, Opinion and Judgment, 4 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4,
at 411, 499.
99. Id. at 497.
100. See id., Indictment, at 15. Another tribunal found the accused guilty of crimes against
humanity without addressing the war nexus requirement, because all the acts charged took place
after the commencement of the war or in occupied territory. See, e.g., United States v. Greifelt,
Opinion and Judgment, 5 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 88, 152-54.
101. United States v. Altstoetter, Indictment, 3 CCL 10TRIALS, supra note 4, at 15.
102. Count Two charged as follows: "Between September, 1939 and April, 1945, all of the
defendants herein unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly committed war crimes, as defined by
Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted,
took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving the
commission of atrocities and offenses against persons and property, including, but not limited
to, murder, torture, and illegal imprisonment of, and brutalities, atrocities, and other inhumane
acts against thousands of persons." Id. at 19.
103. Count One accused the defendants of "acting pursuant to a common design,
unlawfully, willfully,and knowingly did conspire and agree together and with each other.., to
commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in [CCL 10] .... [A]ll of the
defendants herein, acting in concert with each other and with others, unlawfully, willfully and
knowingly, were principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and
were connected with plans and enterprises involving, the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity.... All of the defendants herein... accordingly are individually responsible
for their own acts and for all the acts performed by any person or persons in execution of the
said common design, conspiracy, plans, and enterprises." Id.
104. 3 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 974.
105. Id. at 956 ("[N]either the Charter of the International Military Tribunal nor Control
Council Law No. 10 has defined conspiracy to commit a war crime or a crime against humanity
as a separate substantive crime; therefore, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try any defendant
upon a charge of conspiracy considered as a separate substantive offense.").
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Count one of the indictment, in addition to the separate
charge of conspiracy, also alleged unlawful participation
in the formulation and execution of plans to commit war
crimes and crimes against humanity which actually
involved the commission of such crimes. We, therefore,
cannot properly strike the whole of count one from the
indictment, but, in so far as count one charges the
commission of the alleged crime of conspiracy as a
separate substantive offense, distinct from any war crime
or crime against humanity, the Tribunal will disregard
that charge.'°6
However, because the remaining counts alleged acts committed after
September 1939 and the Tribunal felt bound by the "limitations of time
set forth" within the Indictment,"°7 the judgment left unanswered the
question of whether it would have allowed for the prosecution of
offenses committed before 1939 had they been charged in Counts Two
through Four.
In discussing crimes against humanity more generally, the
Tribunal recognized that the war nexus operated to distinguish crimes
against humanity from ordinary crimes. It suggested an alternative
mechanism when it formulated its own definition of the offense. This
definition emphasized that it must be proven that the defendant
consciously participated in a systematic attack manifesting some
government involvement against a population group:
[C]rimes against humanity as defined in [CCL 10] must
be strictly construed to exclude isolated cases of atrocity
or persecution whether committed by private individuals
or by a governmental authority. As we construe it, that
section provides for punishment of crimes committed
against German nationals only where there is proof of
conscious participation in systematic government
organized or approved procedures amounting to
atrocities and offenses of the kind specified in the act
and committed against populations or amounting to
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds.0 8
The tribunal elaborated that the "overt acts of the several defendants
must be seen and understood as deliberate contributions toward the
106. Id. The Tribunal also cautioned that "[t]his ruling must not be construed.. . as
denying to either prosecution or defense the right to offer in evidence any facts or circumstances
occurring either before or after September 1939, if such facts or circumstances tend to prove or
to disprove the commission by any defendant of war crimes or crimes against humanity as
defined in Control Council Law No. 10." Id.
107. Id. at 985.
108. Id. at 982.
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effectuation of the policy of the Party and State .... The material facts
which must be proved in any case are: (1) the fact of the great pattern or
plan of racial persecution and extermination, and (2) specific conduct
of the individual defendant in furtherance of the plan." 09
The war nexus was directly at issue in the Flick Case in which
the tribunal expressly rejected an argument that the omission of the
limiting language in CCL 10 manifested an intent to broaden the scope
of crimes against humanity. "0 In that case, the accused-officials of the
Flick Concern-were charged with the deployment of slave labor, the
spoliation and seizure of property, and accessory liability for actions of
a criminal organization (the SS). Certain contested transactions charged
as crimes against humanity were undoubtedly completed prior to the
formal commencement of war."
The Prosecution argued that the plain language of the Law
provided jurisdiction over crimes against humanity independent of their
connection to war crimes or crimes against the peace.12 Furthermore,
it noted that the provisions in paragraph five of Article I1 nullifying
pardons for crimes committed and statutes of limitation"3 would be
rendered meaningless if the tribunal had jurisdiction only over those
crimes against humanity committed after the commencement of war
because:
This provision has no application to war crimes, since
the rules of war did not come into play, at the earliest,
before the annexation of Austria in 1938 .... This
provision is clearly intended to apply primarily to crimes
against humanity, and explicitly recognizes the
109. Id. at 1114; see also id. at 984-85 ("Simple murder and isolated instances of atrocities
do not constitute the gravamen of the charge. Defendants are charged with crimes of such
immensity that mere specific instances of criminality appear insignificant by comparison. The
charge, in brief, is that of conscious participation in a nation wide government-organized system
of cruelty and injustice"). As will become apparent, this formulation was to influence the
formulation adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. See
infra Part V.
110. See United States v. Flick, Judgment, 6 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1212 ("It is
argued that the omission of this phrase [in execution of or in connection with...] from Control
Council Law No. 10 evidences an intent to broaden the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to include
such crimes [occurring before September 1, 1939].").
111. See United States v. Flick, Opening Statements for the Prosecution, 6 CCLI 0 TRIALS,
supra note 4, at 77. See generally Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German
Industrialists: The "Other Schindlers," 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 173, 185-206 (1995).
112. See United States v. Flick, Opening Statements for the Prosecution, 6 CCLI 0TRIALS,
supra note 4, at 80, 85.
113. "In any trial or prosecution for a crime herein referred to, the accused shall not be
entitled to the benefits of any statute of limitation in respect of the period from 30 January 1933
to 1 July 1945, nor shall any immunity, pardon, or amnesty granted under the Nazi regime be
admitted as a bar to trial or punishment." CCL 10, supra note 85, art. II, para. 5.
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possibility of their commission on and after 30 January
1933. t 4
Finally, the Prosecution advocated a teleological approach to statutory
construction when it argued that any other interpretation would be
contrary to the Law's object and purpose:
Acts properly falling within the definition in Law No. 10
are, we believe, punishable under that law when viewed
as an occupational enactment, whether or not they were
connected with crimes against peace or war crimes. No
other conclusion can be drawn from the disappearance
of the [war nexus] .... And no other conclusion is
consonant with the avowed purposes of the occupation
as expressed at the Potsdam Conference, cardinal among
which are the abolition of the gross and murderous racial
and religious discrimination of the Third Reich ....
These purposes cannot possibly be fulfilled if those
Germans who participated in these base persecutions of
their fellow nationals during the Hitler regime go
unpunished."5
The Prosecution concluded with the assertion that "crimes against
humanity as defined in Law No. 10 'stand on their own feet' and are
quite independent of crimes against peace or war crimes."' 16
The Tribunal rejected these arguments and held that to interpret
the Law as such would contravene the express language of the Preamble
incorporating the London Agreement of which the Charter was an
integral part. "7 Furthermore, the Tribunal reasoned that its very purpose
was to try "war criminals" who committed crimes during the war or in
connection with war: "[w]e look in vain for language evincing any other
purpose. Crimes committed before the war and having no connection
therewith were not in contemplation."1 8 Thus, the Tribunal dismissed
the crimes against humanity charge in Count Three of the Indictment on
the grounds that the defendant's acquisition of industrial property
occurred prior to the outbreak of war and was thus outside of the
114. United States v. Flick, Opening Statements for the Prosecution, 6 CCL 10Trials, supra
note 4, at 82.
115. Id. at 83.
116. Id. at 84.
117. See United States v. Flick, Judgment, 6 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 1212-14.
118. Id. at 1213 ("To try war crimes is a task so large ... that there is neither necessity nor
excuse for expecting this Tribunal to try persons for offenses wholly unconnected with the war.
So far as we are advised no one else has been prosecuted to date in any of these courts including
IMT for crimes committed before and wholly unconnected with the war.").
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Tribunal's jurisdiction." 9 In so holding, the Tribunal rejected last
minute arguments by the Prosecution that the very purpose of the
defendant's acts was economic preparation for war.' Interestingly, the
Tribunal seemed to rest its determination on the precise date of the
alleged acts and focused less on the connection between the acts and
crimes against the peace or war crimes.' 2 '
The Flick judgment proved insurmountable to the Prosecution
in the Ministries Case, which involved charges against members of the
German Foreign Office for their role in the deportation of Jews. 22
There, the Defense moved to quash Count Four of the Indictment for
lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the acts alleged, which occurred
between January 1933 and September 1939, fell outside of the purview
of CCL 10 which was enacted "[i]n order to give effect to the terms of
.. the London Agreement of August 8, 1945 and the Charter issued
pursuant thereto.'123 The Defense explained the war nexus as a
prerequisite for the exercise of international penal jurisdiction:
The Charter formulated for the first time the criminal
concept of crimes against humanity. The concept which
in itself comprehends far-reaching facts had to be
limited because of the international character of the
119. See id. at 1216. The Tribunal held that even if the contested transactions had occurred
after September 1, 1939, it would still lack jurisdiction given the nature of the offenses charged:
"The 'atrocities and offences' listed therein, 'murder, extermination,' etc., are all offences
against the person. Property is not mentioned. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis the catch-
all words 'other persecutions' must be deemed to include only such as affect the life and liberty
of the oppressed peoples. Compulsory taking of industrial property, however reprehensible, is
not in that category." Id. at 1215.
120. See United States v. Flick, Closing Statement for the Prosecution, 6 CCL lOTRIALS,
supra note 4, at 1008 ("Accordingly, the acts charged in count three were clearly connected
with the commission of crimes against peace, and would be punishable even under the restricted
scope of the doctrine of 'crimes against humanity' adopted by the International Military
Tribunal under the London Charter.").
121. As a United Nations commentary notes, 'The Flick Tribunal appears to have been on
sounder ground when it said that 'crimes committed before the war and having no connection
therewith were not in contemplation' than when it declared that 'In the I.M.T. trial the Tribunal
declined to take jurisdiction of crimes against humanity occurring before September 1, 1939."'
9 LAWREPORTS OFTHETRIALs OFWARCRIMINALs47 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original)
(1949) [hereinafter LAW REPORTS). This latter interpretation of the Nuremberg precedent is
supported by one distinguished commentator. See Schwelb, supra note 5 at 204-05 ("The scope
of the phrase 'before or during the war' is therefore considerably narrowed as a consequence
of the view that, although the time when a crime was committed is not alone decisive, the
connection with the war must be established in order to bring a set of facts under the notion of
a crime against humanity within the meaning of Article 6(c). As will be seen later, this
statement does not imply that no crime committed before 1 September 1939 can be a crime
against humanity. The Nuremberg Tribunal considered some inhumane acts committed prior
to 1 September 1939 to be crimes against humanity in cases where their connection with the
crime against peace was established. Although in theory it remains irrelevant whether a crime
against humanity was committed before or during the war, in practice it is difficult to establish
a connection between what is alleged to be a crime against humanity and a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, if the act was committed before the war ... ").
122. See United States v. von Weizsaecker, 13 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 76.
123. United States v. von Weizsaecker, Defense Motion to Dismiss Count Four of the
Indictment, 13 CCL 10 TRIALS (1952), supra note 4, at 76, 77 (quoting CCL 10 pmbl.).
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prosecution supported thereby. In temporal respect it is
rather comprehensive since it includes crimes against the
civil population prior to and during the war; with regard
to the substance, however, it is limited since only such
crimes are subject to prosecution which have been
committed in execution of or in connection with a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal according to the
Charter. This limitation provides the definition of the
crime against humanity which is subject to criminal
prosecution and therewith also the limitation of a
tribunal's competency for trial.'24
The Defense emphasized that if CCL 10 was to extend the Charter's
definition of crimes against humanity, it could have done so expressi
verbis, especially considering the close connection between the two
enactments. The Defense further argued that CCL 10 did not need to
include the war nexus requirement because it existed already within the
law's frame and delimitation.125
The Prosecution in rebuttal attempted to diminish the prior
rulings under CCL 10 on this point first by denying them precedential
authority'26 and then by distinguishing them on their facts. 27 When
forced to confront the Flick Tribunal's unequivocal application of the
war nexus, the Prosecution argued that the Tribunal there "create[d]
ambiguities where none in fact exist[ed]."' 28 The remainder of the
Prosecution's submission rested on arguments about the juridical
background of the notion of crimes against humanity.
The acts which we have charged as criminal in this
indictment were criminal under international penal law
124. Id. at 77.
125. See id. at 78.
126. See id. at 83, Oral Argument of the Prosecution on the Defense Motion to Dismiss
Count Four ("[Tihe conclusion reached, and the statements made, by these other Tribunals are
certainly entitled to great weight, but are not binding on this Tribunal. Under [CCL 10] ...
certain determinations by the IMT are made binding, but decisions on general abstract questions
of law are not."). The Prosecution here was referring to Article II(1)(d) of CCL 10 which
criminalized "[m]embership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal
by the International Military Tribunal" on the authority of Article 10 of the IMT Charter which
held that "[i]n cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the
competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals for trial
for membership therein before national, military or occupation courts. In any such case the
criminal nature of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned."
IMT Charter, supra note 4, art. 10.
127. See United States v. von Weizsaecker, Oral Argument of the Prosecution on the
Defense Motion to Dismiss Count Four, 13 CCL 10 TRALS, supra note 4, at 84 (arguing that
the Flick decision turned on the nature of the acts alleged-property crimes-and cannot be
read to suggest that the Ministries Tribunal has no jurisdiction to "hear and determine these
charges of murder, enslavement, and other atrocious crimes because they occurred prior to
September 1939").
128. Id. at 92.
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long before the adoption of the [Charter and CCL 10].
• . . Law No. 10, therefore, is not a source of
international law in a strict legislative sense at all,
although it is a prime example of the method by which
international law, like the common law, develops." 9
In support of the argument that the international prohibition of crimes
against humanity predated the Charter, the Prosecution referenced
occasions throughout history when nations intervened in response to
"certain types of atrocities and offenses shocking to the moral sense of
all civilized nations,"' 30 because "unilateral armed intervention... was
the only method for [international penal law's] ... enforcement until
recent years. Indeed, lacking some vehicle for true collective action,
interventions were probably the only possible sanction of that time, but
they are outmoded and cannot be resorted to in these times either safely
or effectively."'131 Furthermore, the Prosecution argued that CCL 10
represents an "occupational enactment" for Germany with "objectives
which the Charter did not comprehend"'132 in that it was concerned
primarily with punishing "crimes committed by Germans against
Germans,"'133 many of which occurred prior to 1939, so that requiring a
connection to the war would nullify the object and purpose of the Law.
The Prosecution also borrowed from the unsuccessful plain language
arguments of the Prosecution in the Flick trial."3
The Prosecution recognized that without the war nexus element,
the definition of crimes against humanity could expand the tribunal's
jurisdiction to encompass municipal law crimes. In response to the
perceived need to distinguish crimes against humanity from such
"ordinary" crimes, the Prosecution borrowed from the formulation of
the Tribunal in the Justice Case:135 "the prosecution must show that
these acts form part of a general pattern or program, in which the
defendants participated, amounting to a systematic program of the
persecution of Jews or other groups of the civilian population of
sufficient scale and violence."' 36 As a final argument, the Prosecution
argued that, in any case, the indictment should be considered as a whole
129. Id. at 85.
130. Id. at 97-98 (citing instances of humanitarian intervention).
131. Id. at 98-99.
132. Id. at 107.
133. Id. at 86.
134. See id. at 94 ("[The laws of war cannot have come into play at the very earliest before
the annexation of Austria in 1938, and it follows that the ... paragraph [5 of Article II of CCL
10] has substantive effect between 1933 and 1938 only with respect to crimes against humanity,
and it is a cardinal principle that statutes are to be construed so as to give effect to their
provisions, not to nullify them.").
135. See id. at 102-31; see also supra text accompanying note 110 (recounting reasoning
in the Justice Case).
136. Id. at 103.
[37:787
HeinOnline  -- 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 816 1998-1999
DEFINING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
and all the acts alleged to be crimes against humanity were in fact
connected with war crimes and crimes against the peace.137
In a tersely worded memorandum,'38 the Tribunal invoked the
nullum crimen sine lege principle 3 9 and refused to go further than the
IMT Judgment that preceded it. 4' Accordingly, it rejected the
Prosecution's construction of CCL 10 on the grounds that it "cannot
justify an extension of the jurisdiction of this Tribunal beyond the
sphere to which the International Military Tribunal properly limited
itself."'' It noted that to "hold otherwise would be to disregard the
well-established principle ofjustice that no act is to be declared a crime
which was not a crime under law existing at the time when the act was
committed."' 42 It concluded broadly that it had not been established that
"crimes against humanity perpetrated by a government against its own
nationals, are of themselves crimes against international law."'14
The war nexus requirement appeared in other Nuremberg-era
legislation enacted by the victorious powers. The Hadamar Trial,"4 for
example, was conducted under a United States directive issued by
General Eisenhower regarding Military Commissions in the European
theater of operations. 45  The directive empowered Military
Commissions to try individuals accused of violations of the laws or
customs of war, the law of nations, or the laws of occupied territory,
including:
murder, torture or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
persons on the seas; killing or ill treatment of hostages;
murder, torture or ill-treatment, or deportation to slave
137. See id. at 89.
138. See id. at 112, Order of the Tribunal Dismissing Count Four, and Tribunal
Memorandum Attached Thereto.
139. The maxim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege announces the principle of
legality----"no crime without law, no punishment without law."
140. See id. at 112-17.
141. Id. at 114.
142. Id. at 116.
143. Id. at 117. Similarly, in the Medical Case, the Tribunal found its jurisdiction limited
to those offenses (in this case medical experimentation) committed after the commencement of
the war. See U.S. v. Brandt, Judgment, 2 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 171, 181. However,
it made no attempt to connect the abuse of German nationals with crimes against the peace or
war crimes or distinguish between the former and crimes against humanity. See, e.g., id. at 227
(holding simply that "[t]o the extent that these experiments did not constitute war crimes, they
constituted crimes against humanity").
144. Trial of Alfons Klein and Six Others, U.S. Military Commission Appointed by the
Commanding General Western Military District, U.S.F.E.T., Wiesbaden, Germany (Oct. 8-15,
1945), reprinted in 1 LAW REPORTS, supra note 121, at 46.
145. United States Military Commissions are convened under the Constitutional power of
Congress to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas and Offences
against the Law of Nations .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Under this power, the Congress
passed the Articles of Warwhich recognized the Military Commission as an appropriate tribunal
for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war, including offenses committed
by enemy combatants.
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labour or for any other illegal purpose, of civilians of, or
in, occupied territory; plunder of public or private
property; wanton destruction of cities, towns villages;.
. . murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, or persecution on political, racial, national or
religious grounds, in execution of or in connection with
any offence within the jurisdiction of the commission,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated; and all other offences against
the laws or customs of war ....146
The Prosecutor of the Military Commission in Wiesbaden charged
certain personnel of a state sanitarium with the general crime of
violating international law for "acting jointly and in pursuance of a
common intent and acting for and on behalf of the then German Reich"
in that they did "wilfully, deliberately and wrongfully, aid, abet, and
participate in the killing of human beings of Polish and Russian
nationality, their exact names and number being unknown but
aggregating in excess of 400, and who were then and there confined by
the then German Reich on an exercise of belligerent control."' 47 The
Military Commission concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over
crimes against humanity insofar as they were not simultaneously
violations of the laws and usages of war.148
Although the war nexus requirement was not an express element
of the offense of crimes against humanity in CCL 10, this review of the
post-Nuremberg jurisprudence reveals that those tribunals that
addressed the question considered themselves bound by the Nuremberg
Tribunal's precedent and accordingly treated the war nexus requirement
as an essential element of the offense to be proven by the prosecution.
This staying power of the war nexus requirement reveals a profound
ambivalence among international lawyers of that era about the propriety
of international law reaching inhumane acts that occurred entirely within
the boundaries of a sovereign state.
As written by the Charter's drafters and as interpreted by the
Nuremberg and subsequent postwar tribunals, the war nexus
requirement had the potential to significantly limit the scope of the
146. Annex II, United States Law and Practice Concerning Trials of War Criminals by
Military Commissions and Military Government Courts, I LAW REPORTS, supra note 121, at
111, 112. The December 5, 1945 United States Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused
War Criminals, promulgated to try minor war criminals, similarly granted jurisdiction over
crimes of "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts committed
against any civilian population before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of, or in connection with, any crime defined herein" [war crimes
and crimes against the peace]. See Annex II, United States Law and Practice Concerning Trials
of War Criminals by Military Commissions and Military Government Courts, supra, at 114.
147. Hadamar Trial, reprinted in I LAW REPORTS, supra note 121, at 47.
148. See id. at 52.
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international legal prohibition against crimes against humanity going
forward. In particular, the IMT Charter's contrived nexus between
crimes against humanity and either war crimes or crimes against the
peace is frequently not borne out in practice. Certain inhumane acts that
defined the Nazi era could never be "shoe-homed" into crimes against
the peace or traditional notions of war crimes:
reports of unheard-of atrocities, the blotting out of whole
peoples, the "clearance" of whole regions of their native
population, that is, not only crimes that "no conception
of military necessity could sustain" but crimes that were
in fact independent of the war and that announced a
policy of systemic murder to be continued in time of
peace.
149
This fact was noted by the Tribunal in the Einsatzgruppen Case: "The
annihilation of the Jews had nothing to do with the defense of Germany,
the genocide program was in no way connected with the protection of
the Vaterland; it was entirely foreign to the military issue .... [T]the
argument that the Jews ...constituted an aggressive menace to
Germany, a menace which called for their liquidation in self-defense, is
untenable as being opposed to all facts, all logic and all law.""' The
war nexus' patent constraints on the scope of international penal law
were to influence future drafters. Accordingly, they experimented with
alternative formulations of the prohibition against crimes against
humanity that would reach peacetime offenses while still satisfactorily
distinguishing crimes against humanity from ordinary crimes.
IV. THE POSTWAR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANrrY LEGACY
Following the conclusion of the Nuremberg Trial, the United
Nations began codifying aspects of the law applied and developed in the
post-war period. The perceived need to distinguish crimes against
humanity from ordinary crimes and the propriety of retaining the war
nexus emerged repeatedly during these subsequent codification efforts.
149. ARENDT, supra note 70, at 257. Arendt decried the war nexus as preventing the
Tribunal from doing full justice to the crime perpetrated against the Jewish people, given that
this crime which "had so little to do with war and its commission actually conflicted with and
hindered the war's conduct ..... Id. at 258.
150. United States v. Ohlendorf, Opinion and Judgment, 4 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4,
at4l1,469-70. See also FINKIELKRAUT,REMEMBERINGINVAIN,THEKLAUSBARBIETRALAND
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 4 (1992) (noting that "the members of exterminating bureaucracy
did not in fact make war," rather, the Nazi treatment of the "Jewish Question" was a "gratuitous
crime totally detached from the necessities and horrors of the military enterprise") (emphasis
in original); Zoller, supra note 12, at 553 (noting that the war nexus obliged the prosecutor to
make an impossible proof: a connection between the Nazi plan of aggression and the Final
Solution).
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 819 1998-1999
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
In these debates, some delegates supported the retention of the war
nexus requirement, while other delegations sought to formulate an
alternative solution to the question of delimiting international
jurisdiction. The result is a veritable juggling of alternative
elements-such as the requirements of state action, proof of a
discriminatory motive on the part of the perpetrator, or acts that are
either large-scale or the result of a policy-and a concomitantly protean
definition of the offense.
In 1946, the United Nations endorsed the principles of
international law within the IMT Charter.1 51 It directed the International
Law Commission (ILC) 52 to "[flormulate the principles of international
law recognized in the Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal and in the
judgment of the Tribunal."'53 The ILC's 1950 report on the "Principles
of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal" retained the war nexus and
defined the offense of crimes against humanity as "[m]urder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are
carried on in execution of or in connexion [sic] with any crime against
peace or any war crime."' 54 The ILC clarified that:
In its definition of crimes against humanity the
Commission has omitted the phrase 'before or during the
war' contained in article 6(c) of the Charter of the
Niirnberg Tribunal because the phrase referred to a
particular war, the war of 1939. The omission of the
phrase does not mean that the Commission considers
that crimes against humanity can be committed only
during a war. On the contrary, the Commission is of the
opinion that such crimes may take place also before a
war in connexion [sic] with crimes against peace. 55
At the same time, the ILC began to prepare a Draft Code of
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Originally, the
ILC defined the offense of crimes against humanity in terms of the
nature and scope of the acts themselves by requiring crimes against
151. See G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946), at 188 (1946).
152. The U.N. created the ILC in order to promote "the progressive development of
international law and its codification." G.A. Res. 174, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 105
(1945).
153. G.A. Res. 177, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 111-12 (1947).
154. Report of the International Law Commission to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. GAOR,
5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11, 14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in 4 AM. J. INT'LL. 126,
132 (Supp. 1950); [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 374.
155. Id.
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humanity to be committed on a massive or systematic basis. 15 6
However, in the 1951 proceedings, delegates decided to delete the
qualifier "mass" from the definition of crimes against humanity
(primarily because the Charter had not employed it). This in turn
provoked a revival of the war nexus by the Chairman, who "was of the
opinion that the deletion of the word 'mass' made it necessary to retain
those reservations [the war nexus], since otherwise a whole series of
domestic crimes would be converted into crimes under international
law."'57  Another delegate agreed that without the war nexus
requirement,
any isolated murder committed for specific political or
other reasons now came under paragraph 9 [the crimes
against humanity provision]. If the Commission now
eliminated the connection between that crime and the
others referred to in the draft code [war crimes and
crimes against the peace], it would make, for example,
the persecution of a single individual belonging to some
political party or other a crime against humanity and,
hence, an international crime. In his view, such a
proposal was Utopian; it would be going too far.'58
Other proponents considered the nexus between a crime against
humanity and an act of war or a war crime necessary to justify
international judicial intervention: "At the London Conference... it
had been generally agreed that, to justify action by the International
Military Tribunal, the acts in question, for example the persecution of
Jews, must be committed in time of war." '159 Finally, other delegates
justified the retention of the war nexus on the basis of their mandate:
"[tihe Commission was not ... entrusted with the preparation of a
general international penal code. The acts covered by the draft code
156. This approach finds some support in Nuremberg-era commentary. See, e.g., HISTORY
OFTHE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OFTHE LAWS OF
WAR 179 (1948) ("As a rule systematic mass action, particularly if it was authoritative, was
necessary to transform common crime, punishable under municipal law, into a crime against
humanity, which this became also a concern of international law. Only crimes which either by
their magnitude and savagery or by their large number or by the fact that a similar pattern was
applied at different times and places endangered the international community or shocked the
conscience of mankind, warranted intervention by States other than that on whose territory the
crimes had been committed, or whose subjects had been their victims.").
157. Summary Records ofthe 3d Session, [1951 )1 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N, 90th mtg., at 70.
Other delegates argued that the qualifier "mass" should have been retained precisely in order
to maintain the distinction between international and domestic crimes. See id. at 69.
158. Id. 91st mtg., at 74 (statement of Kerno). See also id. 91st mtg., at 76 (statement of
Amado) ("The crimes referred to in paragraph 9 were already regarded as crimes per se under
the penal codes of all countries, but became crimes under international law through being
connected with acts calculated to disturb the peace.").
159. Id. 91st mtg., at 74 (testimony of Spiropoulos).
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were 'offences against the peace and security of mankind,' that was to
say, they belonged to a specific category. ' '
Opponents of the retention of the war nexus interpreted it as a
jurisdictional rather than substantive element of the definition of crimes
against humanity in the LMT Charter. According to one delegate, the
war nexus concerned "the required conditions to enable such a crime to
be dealt with by a court . . . . [The Charter] provided that the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal operated only where there was a connexion
[sic]. But the crime could exist even without such a connexion."' 6'
The issue was not resolved by the 1954 proceedings. 62 One
delegate proposed that the war nexus be removed as it was not necessary
for the ]LC to adhere to the Nuremberg Charter which "had dealt with
a specific situation. The interests of mankind as a whole, not only in
time of war, had to be considered."' 63 This same delegate compared
crimes against humanity to genocide and noted that the prohibition
against the latter was equally applicable in times of peace and war.
Although delegates initially deleted the war nexus,164 in subsequent
proceedings the issue was referred to a subsidiary panel for further
discussion. 65 Those delegates eventually voted to replace the war nexus
with the requirement that the defendant be "acting under the instigation
or toleration of the authorities" and be motivated by "political, social,
racial, religious, or cultural grounds."'166 Under this formulation,
ordinary crimes may be prosecuted as crimes against humanity when the
perpetrator is a quasi-state actor and was motivated by discriminatory
animus.' 67
160. Id. 90th mtg., at 71 (delegate Amado). See also id. 91st mtg., at 76 (delegate Alfaro)
(arguing further that "[aill the crimes that it [the ILC] codified must therefore be connected with
war, with preparation of war or with the consequences of war").
161. Id. 91st mtg., at 75 (delegate Sandstrdm).
162. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doe.
A/2693 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 140, 151-52.
163. Summary Records ofthe Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954), reprinted in [ 1954]
1 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 131-32, 267th mtg. (delegate Hsu).
164. See id. at 133.
165. See id. 268th mtg., at 135.
166. Id. 270th mtg., at 148. See generally D.H.N. Johnson, The Draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 445, 464-65 (1955)
(critiquing the drafters for including the discriminatory motive and state action requirements).
One commentator explained the extension of the requirement that the perpetrator act on
discriminatory grounds to all crimes against humanity and not just to acts of persecution, as was
the original IMT formulation, on the grounds that "this was considered necessary once the war-
crime-connection clause was removed i.e. it was necessary to distinguish internationally
illegitimate violations of human rights from legitimate state policy protected by the 'domestic
jurisdiction' provision of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter." Sydney L. Goldenberg, Crimes
Against Humanity-1945-1970, 10 W. ONT. L. REV. 1, 19 n.53 (1971).
167. The ICTY revived this latter element in its formulation of crimes against humanity.
See infra Part V.
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The Code remained virtually dormant168 until the 1980s due to
the inability of delegates to agree upon a definition of "aggression."'' 6
9
In that period, the General Assembly drafted the 1968 Convention on
the Non-Applicability of the Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity, which concerns crimes against humanity
"whether committed in time of war or in time of peace."7 Similarly,
the International Convention in the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid established that apartheid is a crime against
humanity whether committed in wartime or peacetime.' 7' Neither of
these conventions is well-subscribed to.
The ILC returned to the Draft Code in the 1980s in response to
a General Assembly request. 172 At the commencement of proceedings
in 1984, one delegate noted that while belligerency and criminality were
closely linked in the World War II period, in the modem era, "the
concept of an international crime has acquired a greater degree of
autonomy and covers all offences which seriously disturb international
public order."'17 Delegates agreed that the "concept of crimes against
humanity had now become effectively autonomous in law and was no
longer indissolubly linked with war crimes or crimes against the
peace.""7 4 Accordingly, the draft adopted by the ILC in 1991171 provided
that enumerated inhumane acts may be prosecuted as crimes against
humanity even when they occur in times of peace so long as they are
perpetrated in a systematic manner or on a mass scale. 176 Delegates
168. See G.A. Res. 897 (IX) U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 50, U.N. Doc. A12890
(1954) (postponing work on the Draft Code).
169. The G.A. completed a definition of aggression in 1974. See Definition ofAggression,
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142-44, U.N. Doc. A19631
(1974).
170. Adopted by G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40-41, U.N.
Doc. A/7218 (1968), reprinted in 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (adopting the convention on November 26,
1968). See generally Robert H. Miller, The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 65 AM. J. INT'LL. 476 (1971).
171. The General Assembly adopted and opened the Convention for signature and
ratification on November 30, 1973. See G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess.,
Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N. Doc. A19030 (1973) (entry into force July 18, 1976).
172. See G.A. Res. 106, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 239, U.N. Doc. A136/774
(1981).
173. Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on the Draft Code of Offences
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1984] 2 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N, at 90, U.N. Doc.
AICN.41SER.AI1984.
174. Summary Records of the 1960th Meeting, [1986] 1 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 104, U.N.
Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1986. The ILC's Special Rapporteur announced that the autonomy of
crimes against humanity from war crimes "has now become absolute. Today, crimes against
humanity can be committed not only within the context of an armed conflict, but also
independently of any such conflict." Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, Fourth Report on the
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [ 1986] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 53, U.N. GAOR, Int'l Law Comm'n, 38th Sess., at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (1986).
175. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 46 U.N.
GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 6, U.N. Doc. A146/10 (1991), reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B.
INT'LL. COMM'N 79, 94-98, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.AI1991.
176. In this draft, the ILC replaced the term "crimes against humanity" with "Systematic
or Mass Violations of Human Rights." According to Article 21, "An individual who commits
or orders the commission by another individual of any of the following.., violations of human
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explained that the new chapeau 177 was meant to exclude isolated
violations of human rights and ensure that jurisdiction would be allowed
only where the acts listed were committed in a systematic manner or on
a mass scale.178  Delegates elaborated that "[t]he systematic element
relates to a constant practice or to a methodical plan to carry out such
violations. The mass-scale element relates to the number of people
affected by such violations or the entity that has been affected."' 79
Furthermore, in this draft of the Code, proof that the perpetrator was a
state actor was not a required element. 8 °
Despite this apparent solution to the problem of distinguishing
crimes against humanity from ordinary crimes, disagreements continued
to arise within the JLC over the requirement that inhumane acts be
prosecuted as crimes against humanity only when they are perpetrated
on a mass or systematic scale. As the Special Rapporteur noted, "even
a crime perpetrated against a single victim could constitute a crime
against humanity on the basis of its perpetrator's motives and its
cruelty.' 181 Further, the inclusion in the Statute for the International
rights in a systematic manner or on a mass scale consisting of any of the following acts: (a)
murder; (b) torture; (c) establishing or maintaining over persons a status of slavery, servitude
or forced labor; (d) deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) persecution on social,
political, racial, religious or cultural grounds .. " Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, [1991] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 103, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add. 1; see also Summary Records of the 2239th Meeting, [1991] 1 Y.B.
INT'LL. COMM'N 218, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1991.
177. The "chapeau" of the treaty provision is the introductory language outlining the
elements that govern all subsequently enumerated crimes against humanity.
178. See Summary Records of the 2239th Meeting, supra note 176, at 222 (statements of
Pawlak, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, and Barsegov). One delegate argued that this
threshold requirement was inappropriate for the crime of "deportation... of a population," an
inherently massive and systematic act. As a result, the text was changed to read: "An individual
who commits or orders the commission of any of the following violations of human rights..
. in a systematic manner or on a mass scale; or deportation or forcible transfer of population
shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced .... Id. (proposal of Graefrath). See also Report
of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 175, at 266
("Isolated acts of murder or torture, and so on, which are not systematic or on a mass scale, no
matter how reprehensible as violations of human rights, do not come under the draft Code.").
179. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the GeneralAssembly, supra note 175,
at 103.
180. See id. at 267. See also Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, [1994] 2 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 40 ("It is the understanding of the Commission that
the definition of crimes against humanity encompasses inhumane acts of a very serious character
involving widespread or systematic violations aimed at the civilian population in whole or in
part. The hallmarks of such crimes lie in their large-scale and systematic nature. The particular
forms of unlawful act... are less crucial to the definition than the factors of scale and deliberate
policy, as well as in their being targeted against the civilian population in whole or in part...
The term 'directed against any civilian population' should be taken to refer to acts committed
as part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population on national, political,
ethnic, racial or religious grounds. The particular acts referred to in the definition are acts
deliberately committed as part of such an attack.").
181. Summary Records of the 2379th Meeting, [1995] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 3, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995. See also Summary Records of the 2386th Meeting, [1995] 1 Y.B.
INT'LL. COMM'N 51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ SER.A/1995 (noting that research has shown that a
violation of human rights need not be massive in order to be a crime against humanity and a
"single atrocity committed against a sole individual could be so shocking as to constitute an
offence against mankind as a whole").
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia of a species of the war
nexus requirement revived arguments for the nexus' inclusion in the
Draft Code. One delegate suggested the Code adopt the definition of
crimes against humanity in the ICTY Statute on the grounds that it
would answer many of the criticisms made by
Governments, for it was understood that the definition of
crimes against humanity contained in the Charter of the
Nurnberg Tribunal and the Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia applied only in time
of war and not in time of peace, as would be the case
with the text under consideration, and that, as far as
peacetime was concerned, genocide supplied a sufficient
correction for that apparent defect with regard to crimes
which were crimes against the peace and security of
mankind and not merely international crimes. 82
One delegate asked, "Did the category [of crimes against humanity]
presuppose a link with other crimes in the Code, with war crimes in
particular? ... But how were such crimes to be distinguished from
crimes under ordinary law?"'83  Delegates also experimented with
adding a state action requirement, arguing that acts
committed by persons enjoying the protection or
authorization of a State... warranted classification as
crimes against the peace and security of mankind....
The seriousness of a crime which justified inclusion in
the Code lay precisely in the fact that it was committed
by someone enjoying the protection or the consent of the
State to kill, enforced disappearances or torture. 84
Delegates returned repeatedly to the question that had plagued them:
"The basic question was at what point a violation of a humanitarian
principle or human rights violations, which were essentially matters
182. Summary Records of the 2379th Meeting, [1995] 1 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 3,6, U.N.
Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995 (statement of Pellet).
183. Summary Records of the 2385th Meeting, [1995] 1 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 43, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995 (statement of Tomuschat).
184. Summary Records of the 2384th Meeting, [1995] 1 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 33, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A!1995 (statement of Carreno). The inclusion of a state action requirement
has been supported by some commentators. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, supra note 40, at 470-71
("The prerequisite legal element discussed above (state action or policy) is, therefore,
indispensable to the legal nature of 'crimes against humanity,' and must be established before
an international criminal charge can be brought against an alleged perpetrator. This becomes
particularly important since Post-Charter Legal Developments have removed the connection
between 'crimes against humanity' and 'crimes against the peace' or 'war crimes.' In the
absence of such a link to internationally prohibited conduct, 'crimes against humanity' becomes
less violable as an international crime unless another link joins it to the valid sphere of
international criminalization.").
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within the national jurisdiction, became an international problem that
came within international jurisdiction."' 85 In its final comprehensive
formulation of the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, the ILC defined crimes against humanity in terms
of two elements: scale and state action. Accordingly, the 1996 Draft
Code defines crimes against humanity as "any of the following acts,
when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and
instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group:
(a) murder (b) extermination .... -186 In this way, the final ILC draft
definitively eliminated the war nexus requirement. Instead, the
Commission defined the offense with reference to the nature of the acts
themselves-i.e., their widespread or systematic nature-and state
action. Despite the ILC's extensive deliberations, this definition has not
yet been universally accepted and has in certain respects been mooted
by subsequent codification efforts.
V. THE AD Hoc INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL'S SOLUTION
TO THE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY DILEMMA
One of the most recent articulations of the prohibition against
crimes against humanity reintroduced the war nexus despite its apparent
abandonment by the ILC. Article 5 of the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 87 confers jurisdiction over
certain prohibited acts "when committed in armed conflict, whether
international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian
population." '88 The war nexus requirement was included in the ICTY
Statute even though the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant
185. Summary Records of the 2385th Meeting, [1995] I Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 45, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995 (statement of Rao).
186. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, A/51/10 (1996), at 93-94.
187. The ICTY was established by the U.N. Security Council acting under Chapter VII,
which required a determination that events in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to
international peace and security. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993).
188. ICTY Statute, supra note 22, art. 5. The Commission of Experts established to
investigate violations of inteinational law in the former Yugoslavia noted that the definition of
crimes against humanity in the statute for the ICTY codified the principles of international law
affirmed by the General Assembly in Resolution 95(I):
The Nuremberg application of 'crimes against humanity' was a response to
the shortcoming in international law that many crimes committed during
the Second World War could not technically be regarded as war crimes
stricto sensu on account of one or several elements, which were of a
different nature. It was, therefore, conceived to redress crimes of an
equally serious character and on a vast scale, organized and systematic, and
most ruthlessly carried out.
Final Report ofthe Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security CouncilResolution
780, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., Annex VI, at 21, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994).
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to Security Council Resolution 780189 and several states"9 indicated that
it was not an inherent element of the prohibition against crimes against
humanity. Nonetheless, comments by the Secretary-General, who
emphasized that crimes against humanity are prohibited "regardless of
whether they are committed in an armed conflict, international or
internal in character," suggested that this limitation in the Statute is
jurisdictional rather than definitional.' 91
189. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
CouncilResolution 780, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., Annex VI, at 21, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994)
("Crimes against humanity are also no longer dependent on their linkage to crimes against the
peace or war crimes.").
190. See, e.g., Letter ofApril 13, 1993 From the Permanent Representative of Canada to
the United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/25594 (Apr. 14, 1993), at 3 (proposing that the Tribunal's
subject matterjurisdiction include "Crimes against humanity under customary or conventional
law including such acts as wilful killing and deliberate mutilation, extrajudicial and summary
execution, sexual assault, slavery, torture, illegal detention, deportation, forced labour or any
other inhumane act or omission that is committed against any civilian population or any
identifiable group of persons, and that constitutes a contravention of customary international
law or conventional international law .. "); Letter of February 16, 1993from the Permanent
Representative of Italy to the United Nations, U.N. Doc S/25300 (Feb. 17, 1993), at 3
(tendering submission prohibiting "crimes against humanity consisting of systemic or repeated
violations of human rights, such as wilful murder and deliberate mutilation, rape, reducing or
keeping persons in a state of slavery, servitude or forced labour, or persecuting or heavily
discriminating against them on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds; or
deporting or forcibly transferring populations"); Letter of April 5, 1993 From the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America, U.N. Doc S/25575 (Apr. 12, 1993), at 6
(suggesting that the Tribunal be empowered to prosecute "[a] cts of murder, torture, extrajudicial
and summary execution, illegal detention and rape that are part of a campaign orattack against
any civilian population in the former Yugoslavia on national, racial, ethnic or religious
grounds."). But see Letter of March 31, 1993 From the Representatives of Egypt, The Islamic
Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, SaudiArabia, Senegal and Turkey to the United Nations,
UN Doc. No. A/47/920. S/25512 (Apr. 5, 1993) (proposing that the Tribunal have competence
over crimes against humanity, "defined in articles 6(c) and 5(c) of the London and Tokyo
Charters, respectively, and as further developed by customary international law, which includes:
murder, torture, mutilation, rape, reducing or keeping a person in a state of slavery, servitude
or forced labour, deporting of forcibly transferring populations, systemic pillage and looting,
systemic destruction of public and private property, when committed as part of a policy of
persecution on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds ....").
191. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, para 47, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1192
(1993). This interpretation is supported by some commentators. See VIRGINIA MORRIS &
MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 239 (1995) ("This limitation is temporal rather than substantive in
character, as indicated by the phrase 'when committed in armed conflict.' The phrase does not
require any connection with a war crime or any substantive connection to an armed conflict.").
In contrast to the Yugoslav International Tribunal, the Statute of the Rwandan International
Tribunal does not recite the war nexus and provides that the Tribunal "shall have the power to
prosecute persons responsible for . . . crimes when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious
grounds." Establishing the International Tribunalfor Rwanda, U.N. SCOR Res. 955, art. 3,
U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1603 (1994). SeeTheodorMeron,
International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 557 (1995) ("By
making no illusion to the international or noninternational character of the conflict, the broad
language of Article 3 of the Rwanda Statute ... both strengthens the precedent set by the
commentary to the Yugoslavia Statute and enhances the possibility of arguing in the future that
crimes against humanity (in addition to genocide) can be committed even in peacetime."). This
formulation includes the discriminatory intent element debated by the ILC, probably because
it was included within the Rwanda Commission of Experts Report, which defined crimes against
humanity as: "gross violations of fundamental rules of humanitarian and human rights law
committed by persons demonstrably linked to a party to the conflict, as part of an official policy
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In Prosecutor v. Tadi4 the second case to go to judgment before
the ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY confronted the rather sparse definition of
crimes against humanity in its Statute. During the jurisdictional phase,
the Appeals Chamber.9 confirmed that conviction for crimes against
humanity under customary international law no longer requires proof of
a link to a state of war or to war crimes. 113 During the trial phase, Trial
Chamber II elaborated on this interpretation and suggested a novel
mechanism for distinguishing crimes against humanity from ordinary
crimes that turns on the mens rea of the defendant and the existence of
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. 94
Although this aspect of the Opinion and Judgment sufficiently defined
crimes against humanity in such a way that does not subject ordinary
municipal crimes to international jurisdiction, the Trial Chamber
proceeded to increase unnecessarily the prosecution's burden of proof
by adding additional elements to the definition of the offense that do not
appear in the Tribunal's Statute. 95 In identifying the elements of a
crimes against humanity charge, the Trial Chamber was not expressly
concerned with distinguishing crimes against humanity from ordinary
crimes or with delimiting international jurisdiction. However, the
elements it added were drawn from the ILC's debates on this topic
which suggests that these concerns may in fact undergird its reasoning.
In a preliminary motion'96 in the Tadid case, the Defense
challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, including the jurisdiction
rationae materiae under Article 5 by reviving the war nexus
requirement and claiming that the prosecution had not satisfied this
element. 97 It argued that, contrary to the formulation of Article 5,
customary international law dating from the Nuremberg era conferred
jurisdiction over only those crimes against humanity committed "in the
execution of or in connection with" an international, as opposed to
internal, armed conflict.'98 Accordingly, the Defense concluded that,
based on discrimination against an identifiable group of persons, irrespective of war and the
nationality of the victim, and includes acts such as the following: Murder; Extermination..."
FinalReport of the Commission ofExperts EstablishedPursuant to Security CouncilResolution
935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, at 3, U.N. Doe. S/1994/1405 (1994).
192. The Yugoslavia Tribunal is composed of three Trial Chambers and a single Appeals
Chamber.
193. See infra text accompanying note 211.
194. See infra text accompanying note 231-33. This mechanism has its roots in the formula
proposed by the tribunal in the Justice Case, see supra text accompanying note 109, and
Canadian crimes against humanity case law, see infra text accompanying note 236.
195. See infra text accompanying notes 219, 247.
196. According to what is now Rule 72(A) (then Rule 73(A)) of the Tribunals Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, preliminary motions by the accused include (i) objections on the lack
ofjurisdiction; (ii) objections based on defects in the form of the indictment; (iii) applications
for severance of crimes joined in one indictment; and (iv) objections based in the denial of
request for assignment of counsel. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 72(A), U.N.
Doc. No. IT/32/Rev. 13 (July 9-10, 1998), at 52.
197. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (Int'l
Crim. Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, June 23, 1995).
198. Id. at 12-13.
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given the Nuremberg formulation and the subsequent developments in
customary law, Article 5 of the Statute impermissibly broadened the
scope of the prohibition against crimes against humanity, violated the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege,t99 and contravened the object and
purpose of the Statute. According to the Defense, this requirement of
the existence of an international armed conflict was not satisfied in the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.2°
In response, the Prosecution attempted to demonstrate that the
war nexus requirement was no longer a substantive element of crimes
against humanity. It claimed that Article 5 represents a more limited
formulation of the prohibition against crimes against humanity than is
found in customary international law.20 ' Further, according to the
Prosecution, the IMT Charter "was not intended as an inherent or
general restriction on the scope of crimes against humanity under
general international law since the ad hoc jurisdiction of the
[Nuremberg] Tribunal was limited to the 'just and prompt trial and
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis.' 20 2 The
Prosecution observed that the Secretary General's Report confirms that
Article 5 of the Statute was not based exclusively on Article 6(c) of the
IMT Charter: "Crimes against humanity were first recognized in the
Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, as well as in Law No.
10 of the Control Council of Germany."20 3 Finally, the Prosecution
tracked the definition of crimes against humanity found in other
contemporary formulations-such as the work of the ILC, the Genocide
Convention, and the Apartheid Convention2 4  to conclude that "the
more stringent requirement under Article 5 of the ICTY Statute that
199. See id. According to the Report of the Secretary-General, "the application of the
principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of
international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law." Report of
the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, supra note
19 1, at para. 34.
200. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (Int'l
Crim. Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, June 23, 1995), at 4, 13 ('The conflict in Bosnia,
therefore, has to be regarded as an internal conflict within the internationally recognized state
of Bosnia-Herzegovina."). The Defense successfully advanced this characterization to challenge
charges against Tadid under Article 2, which concerns "grave breaches" of the Geneva
Convention and which is applicable only to international armed conflicts. See id. at 11;
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. former
Yugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), at 227-28, paras. 607-08 (dismissing Article 2 charges
on the grounds that the victims of the acts alleged were not "protected persons" within the
meaning of the Geneva Conventions because the conflict was not "international"). But see
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald
Regarding the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., Trial
Chamber II, May 7, 1997) (dissenting from the Trial Chamber's holding on the
"internationality" of the conflict).
201. See Prosecution v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Response to the Motion of the Defense
on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, July 7,
1995), at 8.
202. Id. at 54.
203. Id. at 56 (quoting Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, supra note 191, at 13, para. 47).
204. See id. at 56-58.
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crimes against humanity be linked to "armed conflict, whether
international or internal in character" cannot be considered as ex post
facto application of criminal law. ' 0 5 In other words, if customary
international law did not require proof of a nexus with armed conflict in
order to secure a conviction for crimes against humanity, the Statute
could not violate the legality principle if it increased the Prosecution's
burden by requiring proof of such a nexus.
The Trial Chamber largely ratified the Prosecution's arguments
when it concluded that the "nexus in the Nuremberg Charter between
crimes against humanity and the other two categories, crimes against
peace and war crimes, was peculiar to the context of the Nuremberg
Tribunal established specifically 'for the just and prompt trial and
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis
countries.' 2 1 6 The Trial Chamber elaborated that:
the definition of Article 5 is in fact more restrictive than
the general definition of crimes against humanity
recognised by customary international law. The
inclusion of the nexus with armed conflict in the article
imposes a limitation on the jurisdiction of the
International Tribunal and certainly can in no way offend
the nullum crimen principle so as to bar the International
Tribunal from trying the crimes enumerated therein.
Because the language of Article 5 is clear, the crimes
against humanity tried in the International Tribunal must
have a nexus with an armed conflict, be it international
or internal.0 7
Because the Trial Chamber determined that it would have jurisdiction
over the crimes alleged regardless of whether the conflict was deemed
international or internal, it declined to rule on the nature of the
conflict.2 °s
205. Id. at 59. The Prosecution also argued that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was
international for the purposes of establishing Article 2 jurisdiction. See id. at 36-46.
206. Prosecution v. Tadid, (Case No. IT-94-I-T, Decision on the Defence Motion (Int'l
Crim. Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, Aug. 10, 1995), at 30 (quoting IMT Charter art.
1).
207. Id. at 32.
208. But see Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Separate Opinion of Judge Li
on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo.,
App. Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995), at 8, para. 20 (arguing that the tribunal should have ruled on the
nature of the conflict in order to establish its jurisdiction with respect to Article 2).
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On interlocutory appeal of the dismissal of the Defense
motion,209 the Appeals Chamber confirmed this ruling.210 The Chamber
held that:
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law
that crimes against humanity do not require a connection
to international armed conflict. Indeed,. . . customary
international law may not require a connection between
crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus,
by requiring that crimes against humanity be committed
in either internal or international armed conflict, the
Security Council may have defined the crime in Article
5 more narrowly than necessary under customary
international law.2 '
The war nexus requirement reappeared at the trial stage when the
Trial Chamber had to determine the way in which the Statute's version
of the war nexus requirement would operate, particularly with respect
to the degree of nexus required by the Statute. In its pretrial brief, the
Prosecution argued that in order to satisfy the war nexus element, it was
sufficient to demonstrate that the crimes were committed:
"during a period of armed conflict" or "in time of armed
conflict." . . . Accordingly, to establish the nexus
necessary for a violation of Article 5, it is sufficient to
demonstrate that the crimes were committed at some
point in the course or duration of an armed conflict, even
if such crimes were not committed in direct relation to
or as part of the conduct of hostilities, occupation, or
other integral aspects of the armed conflict."2
209. According to Rule 72(B)(ii), decisions on preliminary motions are without
interlocutory appeal with the exception of motions challenging jurisdiction. See Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 196, at 52.
210. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal in Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., App. Chamber, Oct. 2,
1995).
211. Id. The Appeals Chamber determined that an "armed conflict" exists "whenever there
is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State." Id. at 37, para.
70. The Appeals Chamber emphasized that "the temporal and geographical scope of both
internal and international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and place of
hostilities," id. at 36, para. 67, and concluded that the alleged crimes did occur in the context
of an armed conflict such that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over them under Article 5. See id.
at 37, para. 70.
212. Prosecution v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief (Int'l Crim.
Trib. formerYugo., Trial Chamberll, Apr. 10, 1996), at44, citing Provisional Verbatim Record
of3217th Meeting, U.N. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993) (compiling supportive interpretations of
the Security Council of this phrase).
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In contrast, the Defense argued that the acts must be perpetrated "in" an
armed conflict." 3
The Trial Chamber interpreted the Statute's definition of crimes
against humanity as containing two conditions of applicability-the acts
must be committed first, within the context of a war and second, against
a civilian population. The Chamber further explained that each
condition contained a bundle of substantive elements that must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution in order to secure
conviction.2"4 In discussing the first condition of applicability for
Article 5, the Trial Chamber held that the formulation of the war nexus
in the Statute "necessitates the existence of .an armed conflict and a
nexus between the act and that conflict." ' 5 In other words, the act must
have occurred "in the course or duration of an armed conflict" and must
be linked geographically as well as temporally with the armed
conflict." 6 It is not necessary, however, for the acts to occur "in the heat
of battle" or that the commission of a crime against humanity be
connected with that of a war crime. 17
The Trial Chamber went farther than this, however, and held that
the war nexus requirement elevated the Prosecution's burden of proof
with respect to the defendant's mens rea s by requiring proof that the
defendant acted on the basis of non-personal motives. In this way, the
Chamber transformed the war nexus, a jurisdictional limitation of
213. Prosecution v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Response ofthe Defense to the Prosecutor's
Pre-Trial Brief (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, Apr. 23, 1996), at 17-18.
214. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), at 235, para. 625.
215. Id. at 236, para. 626. In so holding, the court noted that the precise text of the
Nuremberg Charter's war nexus was more limitative in that it required that the enumerated acts
be committed "in execution of or in connection with" war crimes or crimes against the peace.
Id. at 236, para. 627. See James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of
International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'LL. 639,650 (1993)
(noting that the ICTY Statute requires "only a connection between crimes against humanity and
armed conflict, which is not itself a crime under the statute; it thus marks a modest advance over
the Nuremberg Charter by expressly removing the requirement of connection to another crime
under international law").
216. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), at 239, para. 633.
217. Id. at 238-39, para. 632. As support for this particular construction, the Trial Chamber
noted that several permanent members of the Security Council interpreted this element to mean
that the acts alleged were committed "during a period of armed conflict." Id. at 238, para. 631
(citing Provisional Verbatim Record of 3217th Meeting, U.N. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993) at 11
(statement of France to the effect that offenses must be committed "during h period of armed
conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia"), 16 (statement of the United States), 19
(statement of the United Kingdom), 45 (statement of the Russian Federation)). In treating
Security Council member statements as authoritative interpretations of provisions of the Statute,
the Trial Chamber invoked the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber in the jurisdictional phase.
See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal in Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., App. Chamber, Oct. 2,
1995), at 50, para. 88 (noting that an uncontested declaration by a Security Council member
constitutes an "authoritative interpretation" of a statutory provision).
218. "Mens rea" refers to the subjective state of mind required by the definition of an
offense. See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, The Present Significance of Mens Rea in the
Criminal Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399 (1934).
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Article 5 according to its own reasoning, into a substantive mens rea
element of crimes against humanity. According to the Chamber, this
additional element requires that "the act and the conflict must be related
or, to reverse this proposition, the act must not be unrelated to the armed
conflict, must not be done for purely personal motives of the
perpetrator., 219 In other words, "while personal motives may be present
they should not be the sole motivation for the act."220
The Prosecution appealed this new element both as an error of
law and on policy grounds. It observed that Article 5 does not contain
a requirement that crimes against humanity cannot be committed for
purely personal reasons.221  For support of its position that crimes
against humanity can be committed for personal motives, the
Prosecution cited several domestic post-World War II cases involving
convictions for crimes against humanity for what appeared to be purely
personal motives. For example, in one case, the defendant's sole motive
for denouncing the victim was to "get rid of' her and her "hysterical
behavior.' 222 In a second case, a court held that a perpetrator of a crime
against humanity is:
anyone who contributes to the realization of the
elements of the offence, without at the same time
wishing to promote National Socialist rule, which is the
source and beneficiary of the offence, but who acts
perhaps out of fear, indifference, hatred for the victim or
out of some other ulterior motive. For, in cases of acting
out of such motivations, the offence is connected with
the rule of violence.223
In other words, this case stands for the proposition that the defendant's
motives for committing a crime against humanity are irrelevant and thus
need not be related to a prevailing armed conflict. Finally, the
Prosecution argued that the object and purpose of the Statute would be
defeated if perpetrators would escape liability for crimes against
219. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), at 239, para. 634.
220. Id. at 254, para. 658.
221. See Prosecution v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Brief of Argument of the Prosecution
(Cross-Appellant) (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., App. Chamber, Jan. 12, 1998), at 60.
222. OGHBZ, Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court for the British Zone (Nov. 11,
1948), STS 78/48, reprinted in 2 JUSTIZ UND NS-VERBRECHEN 498 (1945-1966) (unofficial
translation).
223. OGHBZ, Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court for the British Zone (Mar. 5, 1949),
STS 19149, reprinted in 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES FOR DIEBRITISCHE
ZONE, 321, 341 (1949) (unofficial translation).
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humanity if they were able to demonstrate that they acted for purely
personal motives."
In discussing the second condition of applicability for Article 5,
the Trial Chamber interpreted the term "population" in the phrase
"directed against a civilian population" to require a showing that the
crimes committed were of a collective nature. At first, the Trial
Chamber appeared to borrow from the work of the ILC225 when it
indicated that the collective nature of crimes against humanity
"exclude[s] single or isolated acts which, although possibly constituting
war crimes or crimes against national penal legislation, do not rise to the
level of crimes against humanity." '226 The Opinion continued that the
"acts must occur on a widespread or systematic basis"227 with the former
term referring to the number of victims and the latter to a "pattern or
methodical plan."22 This reasoning implied that the particular acts to
be prosecuted must involve multiple victims or a pattern of behavior.
Later in the Opinion and Judgment, however, the Trial Chamber
appeared to contradict itself when it concluded that a single act can in
fact constitute a crime against humanity: "Clearly, a single act by a
perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility
and an individual need not commit numerous offenses to be held
liable." '229 This holding is in keeping with a ruling of another Trial
Chamber, which held that:
Crimes against humanity .. must be widespread or
demonstrate a systematic character. However, as long as
there is a link with the widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population, a single act could qualify
as a crime against humanity. As such, an individual
committing a crime against a single victim or a limited
number of victims might be recognised as guilty of a
224. See Prosecution v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Brief of Argument of the Prosecution
(Cross-Appellant) (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo, App. Chamber, Jan. 12, 1998), at 65-66. This
appeal will be heard in early 1999.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 177-81, 186.
226. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), at 244, para. 644.
227. Id. at 244, para. 644; see also id. at 245-46, para. 645 (emphasizing that the required
characteristic of "widespreadness" and systematicity are alternatives).
228. Id. at 246, para. 648. Separate and apart from the requirement that the acts be related
to a systematic attack against a civilian population, the Trial Chamber also discussed whether
the acts must be perpetrated in pursuance of a policy of a state or a non-state entity. Id. at 250,
para. 653. Although the Trial Chamber entitled this section of the Opinion and Judgment "The
Policy Element," its subsequent reasoning suggests that proof of a policy is a mere corollary to
the requirement that the acts be part of a widespread or systematic attack: "[n]otably, if the acts
occur on a widespread or systematic basis that demonstrates a policy to commit those acts,
whether formalized or not." Id. at 250, para. 653.
229. Id. at 247-48, para. 649.
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crime against humanity if his acts were part of the
specific context identified above.23
The Tadic-Trial Chamber resolved this apparent inconsistency in its own
reasoning by applying the characteristics of "widespread" and
"systematic" to the prevailing attack against a civilian population rather
than to the individual acts themselves and by elaborating upon the mens
rea of the perpetrator. The court reasoned that "it is the occurrence of
the act within the context of a widespread or systematic attack on a
civilian population that makes the act a crime against humanity as
opposed to simply a war crime or a crime against national penal
legislation." '231 Accordingly, it held that so long as the perpetrator acts
with knowledge that his or her act "fits in with" a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population, a single enumerated act
can constitute a crime against humanity if the other elements for
conviction are satisfied.23Z Under this formulation, the definition of
crimes against humanity contains two mental state requirements. First,
the Prosecution must prove the mental state associated with the
underlying enumerated offense (i.e., murder, etc.). Second, the
prosecutor must prove that the perpetrator knew of "the broader context
in which his act occurs"233 (i.e., the attendant circumstances in which he
or she acted).2 34
This two-tiered approach was substantially borrowed from the
reasoning of the Canadian courts in Regina v. Finta.235 In that case, the
230. Prosecutor v. Msksic, Case No. IT-95-13-R61, Review ofIndictment Pursuant to Rule
61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber I,
Apr. 3, 1996), at 13, para. 30. Rule 61 (Procedure in Case of Failure to Execute a Warrant) is
activated upon the failure of the accused to appear before the Tribunal and allows the Trial
Chamber entertain witnesses and evidence in order to determine whether there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused committed the offenses for which he is charged in the
indictment.
231. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), at 252, para. 656.
232. Id. at 254, para. 659; see also id. at 253, para. 657. Note, however, that the Trial
Chamber is quite imprecise with its terminology. For example, in a different section of its
Opinion and Judgment, the Chamber refers to "the widespread or systematic acts." Id. at 248,
para. 650.
233. Id. at 253, para. 656.
234. In this way, the Trial Chamber mirrored the approach taken by the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code, which provides that the objective elements of an
offense-conduct, attendant circumstances, and result-are associated with culpability terms
that may differ within a particular offense. See generally Paul H. Robinson et al., Element
Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV.
681 (1983) (praising this "elemental analysis" approach).
235. 69 O.R.2d 557 (H.C. 1989), 92 D.L.R.4th 1 (Ont. C.A. 1992), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701.
Imre Finta was the first suspected Nazi war criminal prosecuted under a Canadian statute that
grants domestic jurisdiction over acts committed extraterritorially that constituted war crime or
crimes against humanity and were unlawful under the laws of Canada at the time they were
perpetrated. See CAN. CRIM. CODE, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 7(3.76) (1985). Finta was charged with
unlawful confinement, robbery, kidnapping and manslaughter as both crimes against humanity
and war crimes (a total of eight counts). His jury acquittal was affirmed by the Ontario Court
of Appeal, 73 C.C.C.3d 65 (Ont. C.A. 1992), and the Supreme Court of Canada, [1994] 1
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Court of Appeals held that the requisite "international element" that
distinguished crimes against humanity from ordinary crimes resided
simultaneously in the actus reus and the mens rea of the crime. With
regard to the former, the defendant's act must take place within a
particular set of circumstances. With respect to the latter, the Court
noted that the relevant Canadian statute did not define the mental state
that "must accompany the existence of the facts or circumstances which
bring an act within those definitions .... [S]ince the international
component of the charges is central to Finta's culpability, it is necessary
to read a fault requirement into those definitions."236 Furthermore,
Knowledge of the existence of the facts or circumstances
which bring the conduct within the definition of the
prohibited conduct is commonly required where a
definition of culpable conduct is silent as to the
necessary fault requirement. We would, as the trial
judge did, hold that knowledge of the circumstances or
facts which bring an act within the definition of a war
crime or crime against humanity constitutes the mental
component which must coexist with the prohibited acts
to establish culpability for those acts.2
37
In affirming this formulation, the majority238 of the Supreme Court
emphasized that "[p]roof of this mental element is an integral part of
determining whether the offences committed amount to a... crime
against humanity." '239 Furthermore, "in order to constitute a crime
against humanity or a war crime, there must be an element of subjective
knowledge on the part of the accused of the factual conditions which
render the actions a crime against humanity."2' According to the
Supreme Court, it sufficed that the accused was willfully blind to these
circumstances.24' Likewise, the Yugoslav Tribunal's Trial Chamber
S.C.R. 701.
236. Regina v. Finta, 92 D.L.R.4th 1, 84 (Ont. C.A. 1992).
237. Id.
238. The dissent argued that "there is no need for the jury to be concerned with the mental
element in relation to the war crimes and crimes against humanity beyond those comprised in
the underlying domestic offence with which the accused is charged. . . . [T]he mental
blameworthiness required for such crimes is already captured in the mens rea required for the
underlying offence." [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 754 (La Forest, J., dissenting). According to this
line of reasoning, the offense is "internationalized" by virtue of the existence of the factual
circumstances; the defendant need not know of these circumstances. Id. See generally Judith
Hippler Bello & Irwin Cotler, International Decisions, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 460 (1996)
(criticizing the majority opinion as erecting too high a threshold for conviction). The approach
advocated by the dissent would essentially impose strict liability as to the circumstantial element
of the existence of a widespread and systematic attack.
239. [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 813.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 820. At the same time, the accused need not be aware that his acts constituted
a crime against humanity or were illegal under international law.
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held that knowledge "is examined on an objective level and can
factually be implied from the circumstances."242
The Finta approach adopted by the Tadid Trial Chamber
significantly clarified the prosecution's burden of proof with respect to
the elements of the offense of crimes against humanity. Proof of the
requisite attendant circumstances (an attack on a civilian population)
operates as a threshold jurisdictional inquiry that clearly distinguishes
what would otherwise be municipal crimes within the jurisdiction of
national courts from crimes against humanity appropriate for
international adjudication. This attack need not rise to the level of an
armed conflict, although pursuant to the ICTY Statute's formulation of
the war nexus, the Prosecution must demonstrate some nexus between
the crime against humanity and a state of war. The knowledge mens rea
requirement ensures that the defendant was aware that his or her act
would contribute to the requisite attendant circumstance.24 In contrast
to a strict liability approach to attendant circumstances, this formulation
better achieves the criminal law's twin goals of condemnation and
deterrence. Moreover, resting international adjudication upon the
defendant's mental state justifies the elevated moral stigma and
punishment associated with the perpetration of international crimes.2'
At the same time, it is not necessary for the defendant consciously to
desire to effectuate this contribution, which would unnecessarily
increase the prosecution's burden of proof, suggest a defense that would
be difficult to refute, and (particularly in a multinational jurisdiction)
better ensure that the prosecutorial inquiry remains out of the realm of
motive, which raises vexing issues of proof.245
In the opinion of the Chamber, however, this "knowing" formula
does not exhaust the Prosecution's burden of proof with respect to the
mental state of the accused. In further elaborating upon the second
condition of applicability for Article 5, the Trial Chamber held that the
inclusion of the term "population" in the Statute required that the
242. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), at 253, para. 657.
243. A mens rea requirement of knowledge suggests that the defendant was either directly
conscious of the attendant circumstances, or was otherwise willfully blind to them. Knowledge
can be inferred from the circumstances at hand. See Robinson, supra note 234, at 694-95;
Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) (providing that when knowledge of the existence of a particular
fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high
probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist); United States v.
Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) ("deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally
culpable").
244. I am indebted to Margaret deGuzman for this observation.
245. It has been noted that "[a]n individual's personality and psyche, therefore, largely
determine his or her motives. The exact contours of motive, accordingly, will be within each
individual's knowledge alone.... [As such, a]bsent an explicit admission of racial motivation
by the accused, prosecutors need to rely on circumstantial evidence of the accused's reasons for
perpetrating the alleged crimes. Inferences about motive which are drawn from circumstantial
evidence, however, may be highly inaccurate given the inherent ambiguity of motive itself."
James Morsch, The Problem of Motive in Hate Crimes: The Argument Against Presumptions
of Racial Motivation, 82 J. CRlM. L. 659, 666-77 (1991).
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Prosecution demonstrate that the enumerated acts were "taken on"
discriminatory (i.e., racial, religious, ethnic, or political) grounds.246
The Trial Chamber reached this conclusion notwithstanding that the
majority of the sources it cites-the Nuremberg Charter, CCL 10, the
ILC Draft Code-are to the contrary. 47 As support, the Chamber
referred once more to the Report of the Secretary-General, the
declarations of certain permanent members of the Security Council, 48
and the Rwanda Tribunal's Statute.2 49
It is clear that this additional requirement that the Prosecution
prove a discriminatory animus on the part of the defendant is mandated
by neither customary international law nor the ICTY's Statute 0
Accordingly, the Prosecution in its Appeals Brief argued that only
Article 5(h), "persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds,"
246. The Trial Chamber labels this portion of the Opinion and Judgment "The necessity of
discriminatory intent." It is unclear, however, if the added element is conceived of as a species
of intent or one of motive. Although the Chamber does not employ the term "motive," the
reasoning of the Chamber suggests that the added element actually addresses the motive of the
defendant. Although the terminology in this area of criminal law is plagued by imprecision,
motive generally refers to the idiosyncratic circumstances motivating the actor, in contrast to
intent, which represents the volitional element of the crime or the desire to bring about some
consequence. See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishment For Prejudice: A Commentary on the
Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutory Responses to the Problem of Hate Crimes, 39
S.D. L. REV. 1, 13 (1994) ("[T]he term motive can perhaps be best described as simply the
'why' behind a defendant's conduct, as opposed to the mental states of intent or purpose, which
relate to 'what' the defendant meant to accomplish."). In most common law jurisdictions,
motive is not a material element of the offense, but it may be relevant at the time of sentencing.
See, e.g., Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 823 (Can. 1994) (noting that the perpetrator's
motive is irrelevant and need not be proven by the prosecution). The emerging law governing
so-called "hate crimes" is a notable exception. See generally James B. Jacobs & Jessica S.
Henry, The Social Construction of a Hate Crime Epidemic, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 366
(1996). The distinction between motive and intent in civil law definitions is less precise, and
motive may be a material element of an offense in such jurisdictions. See, e.g., 11 COLLECTION
OF YUGOSLAV LAws: CRIMINAL CODE, art. 135 (1964) (defining murder as "whoever kills
another out of greed, in order to commit or cover up another criminal offense, out of
unscrupulous vengeance or from other base motives").
247. As written, the IMT Charter and CCL 10 envision two classes of crimes: inhumane
acts and persecutions on discriminatory grounds. This bifurcate interpretation of the Charter
was supported by a United Nations analysis of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment: "[ilt
might perhaps be argued that the phrase 'on political, racial or religious grounds' refers not only
to persecutions but also to the first type of crimes against humanity.... This interpretation,
however, seems hardly to be warranted by the English wording and still less by the French text."
THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE NORNBERG TRIBUNAL: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
(Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary-General), supra note 13, at 67.
248. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, (Case No. IT-94-l -T, Opinion and Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib.
former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), at 249-250, para. 652, citing Provisional
Verbatim Recordof3217th Meeting, U.N. S/PV.3217 (May25, 1993) 11 (statement ofFrance),
16 (statement of the United States), 45 (statement of the Russian Federation).
249. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955
(1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1603 (1994). It has been suggested, however, that this
formulation was "derived word-for-word" from the 1993 Secretary General's Report and as
such should not provide an independent source of support for the argument that all prosecutions
of crimes against humanity require proof that the defendant was motivated by a discriminatory
animus. See Yoram Dinstein, Crimes Against Humanity, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AT THE THRESHOLD OFTHE 21ST CENTURY 891, 896 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
250. This element did not appear in the post-World War II proceedings and was considered
but eventually rejected by the ILC in its Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind. See supra text accompanying notes 167, 181, 187.
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contains a discriminatory "grounds" requirement."5 The Prosecution
suggested a theory of statutory construction when it argued that
provisions within the Statute should be interpreted to reflect prevailing
customary international law unless the Statute expressly indicates an
intention to deviate from customary law.52 The Prosecution argued that
the Tribunal should rely on statements of Security Council members as
tools for interpretation only where there is an "obvious lacuna" in the
text of the Statute.53 It noted that "[t]o accord weight to the views of
one or a few Security Council Members, to resolve an ambiguity which
does not exist, would lead to considerable uncertainty in the scope and
content of the applicable law under the Statute."'254
The Prosecution also demonstrated that the Trial Chamber's
interpretation destabilized the structure of the Statute. First, this
interpretation relegated the persecution clause to a residual provision
that would apply to "a small class of cases not covered by other
provisions of Article 5." 55 Second, it rendered Article 5(i)-the "other
inhumane acts" clause-redundant.2 5 6 The Prosecution argued that the
persecution clause should instead be read to provide a basis for
additional criminal liability for all inhumane acts when they are
committed on discriminatory grounds. In other words, if a defendant is
charged with an intentional killing motivated by racial animus, she or
he should be able to be convicted under Article 5(a)-murder-as well
as under Article 5(h)-persecution.257 Finally, the Prosecution argued
251. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Brief of Argument of the Prosecution
(Cross-Appellant) (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., App. Chamber, Jan. 12, 1998), at 68.
252. See id. at 71-72.
253. Id. at 73. As an example, the Prosecution cited Article 3 of the Statute, which by its
terms applies to unenumerated violations of the laws or customs of war: "The International
Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws of customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to: (a) employment of poisonous weapons .... "
ICTY Statute, supra note 22, art. 3. The Appeals Chamber in the Tadid Jurisdictional Decision
invoked such statements to interpret Article 3 in light of the intentions of the Security Council.
See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal in Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., App. Chamber, Oct. 2,
1995), at 50, para. 88.
254. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Brief of Argument of the Prosecution
(Cross-Appellant) (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., App. Chamber, Jan. 12, 1998), at 74.
255. Id. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int'l Crim.
Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), at 276, para. 702 ("Given the fact... that
the Nurnberg Charter clearly defined two types of crimes against humanity, of which only the
persecution type requires discriminatory intent, there would seem to be no difficulty in attaching
additional culpability to acts which fall within the 'inhumane act' category of crimes against
humanity if motivated by discrimination. Nevertheless, because the Trial Chamber has
incorporated the requirement.., that discriminatory intent is required for all crimes against
humanity, acts that are found to be crimes against humanity under other heads of Article 5 will
not be included in the consideration of persecution as a separate offence under Article 5(h).").
256. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Brief of Argument of the Prosecution
(Cross-Appellant) (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., App. Chamber, Jan. 12, 1998), at 75.
257. The Prosecution's interpretation of the dual role played by the persecution clause in
the definition of crimes against humanity is not the only interpretation possible. It is perhaps
more likely that the persecution clause is meant to reach acts that do not involve significant
invasions of life or liberty, but which become crimes against humanity when they are taken on
discriminatory grounds. In other words, such acts are not considered "inhumane" without this
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that the Trial Chamber's exhaustive enumeration of discriminatory
grounds would fail to protect victim groups that could not be
characterized by the grounds listed by the Trial Chamber but that have
been the victims of crimes against humanity in the past.258 The appeal
on the TadidOpinion and Judgment will be heard in 1999.
In conclusion, in elaborating upon the definition of crimes
against humanity in its Statute, Trial Chamber II attempted to clarify
when inhumane acts and acts of persecution would constitute crimes
against humanity for the purpose of adjudication before the ICTY. The
solution adopted depends in part upon an internationalized version of
familiar theoretical constructs of domestic criminal law-the actus reus
and the mens rea. However, the Trial Chamber reversed this trend
toward the rationalization of international crimes by adding two species
of motive to the definition of crimes against humanity. The requirement
that the defendant act on the basis of other than personal motives
threatens to revive the war nexus requirement by repackaging it in terms
of the motivational state of the defendant. The discriminatory motive
requirement adds nothing to the international nature of the offense and
threatens to exclude from the rubric of crimes against humanity
inhumane acts involving non-enumerated motives. Although the Tadid
Opinion and Judgment was to significantly influence the drafting of the
final Statute for the permanent ICC, the drafters wisely excluded the
Tribunal's extraneous motive requirements.
added element. This could include non-physical acts of economic, linguistic or cultural
discrimination such as a prohibition on religious worship or the use of a national language, even
in private; the systematic destruction of monuments or buildings representative of a particular
social, religious, cultural, or other group; limitations on the professions open to members of
certain groups; restrictions on family life; the plunder of property; the imposition of collective
fines, etc.
258. Id. at 76, citing OGHBZ, Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court for the British Zone
(Mar. 5, 1949), STS 19/49, reprinted in 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES
FOR DIE BRrrISCHE ZONE, 321,341 (1949) (finding accused guilty of crimes against humanity
committed against mental patients); Judgment of Oct. 1, 1946, International Military Tribunal
(Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentence, 22 TRIALS OFWAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILrARY TRIBUNALS 498 (1948), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 293 (1947) (finding
defendant Wilhelm Frick guilty of crimes against humanity on the basis of his knowledge that
"insane, sick, and aged people, 'useless eaters', were being systematically put to death" in war
nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums). The Trial Chamber observed that the crimes in
question clearly satisfied this element. See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion
and Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), at 250, para. 652
("Factually, the inclusion of this additional requirement that the inhumane acts must be taken
on discriminatory grounds is satisfied by the evidence discussed above that the attack on the
civilian population was conducted against only the non-Serb portion of the population because
they were non-Serbs."). This observation should not serve as an additional justification of this
element's inclusion. The work of the ICTY will undoubtedly influence future codification
efforts at the national, regional and international levels, and such a requirement threatens to
significantly limit the scope of the prohibition against crimes against humanity as it applies to
other scenarios.
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VI. THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT'S
CONSENSUS DEFINITION
Immediately after the formation of the United Nations, drafters
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide contemplated the establishment of a permanent international
criminal court.25 9 The ILC was commissioned to study "the desirability
and possibility of establishing an intemationaljudicial organ for the trial
of persons charged with genocide or other crimes . , 6o As was the
case with the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, work on the permanent international criminal court stalled
until the late 1980s when a collection of Latin American and Caribbean
states re-invigorated the project. With prompting from the General
Assembly, the ILC again turned its attention to drafting a statute. After
much delay, the ILC completed a draft statute in 1994 that formed the
basis for intensified consideration by an Ad Hoc Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court2 6' and then a
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court formed by the General Assembly.262 A final Statute was
finally achieved in July 1998 at the Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court.2 63
Members of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court (PrepCom) grappled with the precise
elements to be included within the definition of crimes against
humanity. Delegates noted the need to identify "general criteria for
crimes against humanity to distinguish such crimes from ordinary
crimes under national law and to avoid interference with national court
jurisdiction with respect to the latter.'' 26 Delegates generally focused
259. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art.VI, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan 12, 1951) (providing that individuals
charged with committing genocide shall be tried "by a competent tribunal of the State in the
territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have
jurisdiction").
260. Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260(III)(B), U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
261. See G.A. Res. 49/53 Dec. 9, 1994 (establishing the Ad Hoc Committee).
262. See G.A. Res. 50/46 Dec. 11, 1995 (establishing the Preparatory Committee). After
convening six separate sessions, the Preparatory Committee produced a revised draft Statute that
served as the basis for negotiations at the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court held from June 15 to July 17, 1998 in Rome,
Italy.
263. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July
17, 1998). The Diplomatic Conference was attended by delegations from almost two hundred
states, over 30 observers and intergovernmental organizations, and hundreds of non-
governmental organizations. The author attended on behalf of the Geneva-based International
Service for Human Rights and the New Delhi-based South Asia Human Rights Documentation
Centre.
264. Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee During the Period March
25-April 12, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1 (May 7, 1996), at 16.
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on the criteria contained in Article 3 of the Rwanda Statute.265 For
example, some delegates argued that a conviction for crimes against
humanity required proof that the defendant was motivated by a
discriminatory animus. Others argued that "the inclusion of such a
criterion would complicate the task of the prosecution by significantly
increasing its burden of proof in requiring evidence of this subjective
element."2 66  These delegates further argued that crimes against
humanity could be committed against other groups, including
intellectuals, social, cultural or political groups, and that such an
element was not required under customary international law, as
evidenced by the Yugoslav Tribunal's Statute.267 Most delegates
supported reference to the widespread and/or systematic criteria, and, in
most cases, these characteristics modified the acts committed.268
With respect to the war nexus, some delegates argued that
existing law required some type of connection to an armed conflict and
that in any case, the majority of such crimes were invariably committed
in armed conflict.269 To this suggestion, other delegates argued-with
reference to CCL 10, the Rwanda Statute and the Tadid Opinion and
Judgment-that such a connection was no longer required and that such
crimes can occur in times of peace and in ambiguous situations as
well.27° The 1996 Report noted that:
The view was expressed that peacetime offences might
require an additional international dimension or criterion
to indicate the crimes that would be appropriate for
adjudication by the Court, possibly by limiting the
individuals who could commit such crimes. Some
delegations question the need for an additional criterion
assuming that sufficiently serious, grave or inhumane
acts were committed on a widespread and systemic
basis, with attention being drawn to proposals for
clarifying this general criterion to indicate more clearly
the offences that would be appropriate for international
adjudication.271
265. See id.
266. Id. at 17.
267. See id.
268. See id. ("Some delegations expressed the view that this criterion could be further
clarified by referring to widespread and systematic acts of international concern to indicate acts
that were appropriate for international adjudication; acts committed on a massive scale to
indicate a multiplicity of victims in contrast to ordinary crimes under national law.").
269. See 1 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April and August
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State proposals continued to place the war nexus and discriminatory
motive requirements in brackets, indicating a lack of agreement as to the
text. Such proposals defined crimes against humanity alternatively as:
the following [crimes] [acts], when committed as part of
a widespread [and] [or] systematic attack [on a massive
scale] against any civilian population: (a)
[murder] [willful killing]; (b) extermination . . . (h)
persecutions on political, [national, ethnic,] racial and
religious grounds [in connection with any [other] crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court] ....
["Crimes against humanity" means the following:
[crimes] [acts], when committed as part of a widespread
[and] [or] systematic attack [on a massive scale] against
any civilian population.]272
Other proposals, however, began to approach the formula
adopted by the Trial Chamber in the Tadid Opinion and Judgment: "A
person commits a crime against humanity when... [(c) he commits that
act [knowing it is part of] [with the intent to further] a widespread and
systematic attack against a civilian population]." 73  Alternatively,
"[The following acts when committed as part of a widespread and
systematic attack against any civilian population shall be punishable.
1]274
In the 1997 proceedings, the PrepCom's Working Group on the
Definition of Crimes specifically considered the definition of crimes
against humanity and retained both the war nexus and the discriminatory
motive as optional elements of the offense:
For the purpose of the present Statute, any of the
following acts constitutes a crime against humanity
when committed
[as part of a widespread [and] [or] systematic
commission of such acts against any population];
272. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court (Compilation ofproposals), U.N. GAOR, 51 st Sess., Supp. No. 22A, U.N. Doc.
A/51/22 (1996), at 65. Brackets indicate text that had not yet been agreed upon in the
deliberations.
273. Id. at 67. The brackets within this provision reveal that the drafters were undecided
on the level of mental state associated with crimes against humanity. The two alternatives
correspond to the mental states of knowledge and purpose as found in the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code § 2.02.
274. 2 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court (Compilation ofproposals), U.N. GAOR, 51 st Sess., Supp. No. 22A, U.N. Doe.
A/51/22 (1996), at 65.
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[as part of a widespread [and] [or] systematic attack
against any [civilian population] [committed on a
massive scale] [in armed conflict] [on political,
philosophical, racial, ethnic or religious grounds or any
other arbitrarily defined grounds:] (a) murder .... ]75
The definition of crimes against humanity was not considered at the
next two sittings of the Preparatory Committee, 76 and the above options
appeared in the final consolidated text that served as a foundation for
deliberations in July 1998 in Rome.277
In contrast to the crime of genocide, a consensus definition of
crimes against humanity eluded drafters until the final days of the
Diplomatic Conference. China, India, the Russian Federation and a
number of states from the Middle East continued to support the
retention of the war nexus requirement and the inclusion of a
discriminatory motive element. In the end, though, the most
controversial component of the definition turned on whether terms
"widespread" and "systematic" would be conjunctive or disjunctive as
applied to the attack against the civilian population. Several states
(including India, the United Kingdom, France, Egypt, Turkey, the
Russian Federation, Japan, and the United States) argued that the
prosecution should be required to demonstrate that the attack manifested
both characteristics. Other delegations argued that it would be sufficient
if the attack was either widespread or systematic. The Canadian
delegation suggested a compromise formula for the chapeau of the
crimes against humanity provision to resolve what became an impasse
in the negotiations. 78 A slightly modified version of this formula was
eventually adopted and Article 7 now reads: "For the purpose of this
Statute, 'crimes against humanity' means any of the following acts when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder...
275. Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Heldfrom February 11
to 21, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249.1997/L.5 (Mar. 12, 1997), Annex 1, at 4.
276. See Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held from August
4 to 15, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev. 1 (Aug. 14, 1997); Decisions Taken by the
Preparatory Committee at its Session Held from I to 12 December 1997, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 1997). Nor was this formulation significantly altered
during the more informal intersessional meetings held in The Netherlands. See Report of the
Intersessional Meeting From January 19 to 30, 1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.249/1998/L. (Feb. 1998), pt. 2, art. 5[20], at 16-18. Participants there did note that if the
discriminatory intent clause in the chapeau were retained, it would be necessary to consider the
interrelationship between that clause and the persecution paragraph. See id. at 16.
277. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998), at 25-26.
278. According to this proposal, the chapeau of the crimes against humanity provision
would read: "For the purpose of the present Statute, a crime against humanity means any of the
following acts when knowingly committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population." Proposal on file with the author.
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-"279 In this way, the ICC definition mirrors the core elements of the
formula adopted by the Yugoslav Tribunal in the Tadid case with the
notable exception of the dual burdensome motive elements.
In this way, the drafters of the ICC Statute, representing almost
two hundred states, have confirmed that the existence of a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population is sufficient to justify
international judicial intervention. The existence of this attack entitles
the international community to prosecute individuals who knowingly
contribute to the attack regardless of their motives. It is not necessary
for this attack to rise to the level of an armed conflict as defined by
international law. Drafters specifically rejected alternative formulations
of the offense that relied upon the war nexus requirement and motive
requirements similar to those adopted by the Trial Chamber in the Tadid
case.
The ICC Statute's formulation should be accorded great weight
in future codification efforts and national prosecutions for crimes
against humanity. In particular, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
should articulate a definition of crimes against humanity based solely on
the interplay between the two chapeau elements-the mens rea of the
defendant and the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against
a civilian population. As they incorporate international norms into their
domestic penal codes, national legislatures should borrow from the
chapeau of Article 7 of the ICC Statute to define crimes against
humanity.280 Similarly, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission should utilize this definition as it considers whether the
279. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(July 17, 1998). The explanatory note at Article 7(2)(a) defines "attack directed against any
civilian population" as "a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred
to in paragraph 1 directed against any civilian population, pursuant to or knowingly in
furtherance of a state or organizational policy to commit such acts." Many NGOs at the
Diplomatic Conference objected to this provision on the grounds that it appeared to "smuggle"
the controversial "and" back into the Statute. It was argued that in order to secure a conviction
for crimes against humanity, the prosecutor would have to prove the requisite attendant
circumstance-the existence a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population
involving: (1) multiple acts directed against a civilian population that were (2) pursuant to or
knowingly in furtherance of a governmental or organizational policy to commit those acts. In
other words, the attack must still be widespread and systematic despite the disjunctive formula
in the chapeau. It is clear, however, that this sub-paragraph must be interpreted as compromise
between proponents of the conjunctive and disjunctive formulas such that the burden of proof
on the prosecution is lower than it would have been under the rejected "widespread and
systematic" formulation. See SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTER, THE
NORTH AMERICANS RE-WRITE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN "AND" BY ANY OTHER
NAME IS STILL AN "AND" (July 2, 1998) (on file with author).
280. This would avoid the confusion contained within Australia's War Crimes Amendment
Act of 1988, which treats a "serious crime" as a "war crime" if it was committed "in the course
of political, racial or religious persecution" or "with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group" and was committed "in the territory of a country
when the country was involved in war or when territory of the country was subject to an
occupation." War Crimes Amendment Act 1988, § 7(3). Members of the Australian High
Court treated this crime as a species of crimes against humanity. See Polyukovich v. Regina
(Austr. 1992) 172 C.L.R. 501 (Toohey, J.).
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practice of apartheid constitutes a crime against humanity.28' And, if the
ILC continues its work on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind, the ICC Statute's definition should be
employed. Finally, national judiciaries adjudicating international law
claims... could invoke the ICC Statute's definition of crimes against
humanity given that it is the only multilateral instrument since the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters to comprehensively define the
offense.283
VII. AN HISTORICAL RECAPrrULATION
This history of the definition of crimes against humanity reveals
international law's evolving treatment of the concept of state
sovereignty. On the one hand, the notion of state sovereignty has been
a pillar of the international system since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia
heralded the birth of the modern nation state.284 At the same time, an
unconditional application of sovereignty has the potential to result in
impunity for gross human rights violations committed within the
boundaries of a state. Article 6 of the IMT Charter reflects this tension
in international law between a reverence for state sovereignty and the
emergence of the promotion of human rights as an overarching goal of
the international system. On the one hand, Article 6(a) of the Charter
reinforced the concept of sovereignty by criminalizing crimes against
the peace-the violation of another state's sovereignty. On the other
hand, Article 6(c) pierced the veil of sovereignty by holding national
leaders legally accountable for treatment accorded to their own subjects,
even when such treatment was putatively "legal" under the prevailing
281. The legislative mandate ofthe Trith and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) authorizes
it to investigate crimes that rise to the level of crimes against humanity under international law.
See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, ch. 2 (1995). The Promotion
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act empowers the TRC to inquire into: "gross violations
of human rights, including violations which were part of a systematic pattern of abuse," id.
§4(a)(i), "the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights," id. §4(a)(ii), and
"the question whether such violations were the result of deliberate planning." Id. §4(a)(iv). The
TRC is in the process of determining if the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act
authorizes it to confirm international consensus that apartheid is a crime against humanity.
282. This includes civil cases brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act, which creates
United States federal court jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1988). See, e.g., Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, Case No. 98-V.2470 (N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 20, 1998)
(suing for crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Bosanski Samac, Bosnia and
Herzegovina).
283. It should be noted that the ICC Statute does not purport to codify or establish
customary international law. See ICC Statute, art. 10 ("Nothing in this Part [Part 2, Jurisdiction,
Admissibility and Applicable Law] shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way
existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.").
284. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(1) ('The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members.").
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national law. In other words, the drafters of the Charter simultaneously
fortified and undermined the notion of sovereignty.285
The Charter's war nexus operated to reconcile the tension
between these two provisions. It guaranteed that only when a state
disturbed world order by engaging in aggressive acts would its
sovereignty be challenged by the assignment of criminal liability to its
leaders or other citizens who committed inhumane acts against their
compatriots. In other words, the nexus provided a check on the erosion
of sovereignty inherent in the notion of crimes against humanity." 6 It
sent the message to state leaders that only when they engage in acts of
aggression, and especially if they lose,"' would crimes committed
within state borders be subjected to international scrutiny and
opprobrium.
The war nexus was not the only way to reconcile Articles 6(a)
and 6(c). Instead, the drafters of the IMT Charter could have codified
the classic international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention.288
Humanitarian intervention involves the intervention by one state into the
territorial integrity of another state in order to protect individuals who
are the victims of abuses by fellow citizens that the state is unwilling or
285. Luban, supra note 8, at 784 ("Article 6(c), the most enduring moral achievement of
Nuremberg, is irreconcilable on its face with legal positivism, and thus with the classic doctrine
of sovereignty."); see also FINKIELKRAUT, supra note 150, at 5 (noting that the notion of crimes
against humanity "had never been able to descend from the heights of theory ... for it had
always collided with another founding principle of modem politics-the absolute sovereignty
of the state"); Jos6 J. Alvarez, Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadid Case, 7 EUROP. J. INT'LL. 245,
260 (1996) (noting that the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter undermined their own legacy by
tying crimes against humanity to the crime of aggression and failing to resolve the tension
between statism and human rights). It has been noted that while the criminalization of
aggression indirectly benefits individuals under international law, the primary benefits inures
to the state system. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 31, 33 (1995-1996).
286. This perspective explains the persistent opposition to the abandonment of the war
nexus. See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus
Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1333 (1989) ("Such efforts to detach crimes against humanity from
the law of war have been criticized as entailing international interference in the internal affairs
of sovereign states."). One commentator has speculated that efforts to codify the prohibition
of crimes against humanity in a specialized convention have been rare because the notion of
crimes against humanity challenges the primacy of sovereignty in the international order. See
Zoller, supra note 12, at 558.
287. This application of the war nexus could lead to the conclusion that "[o]nly victor's
justice is possible." Luban, supra note 8, at 808.
288. See id. at 787. See also MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL
ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 90, 101-08 (1977) (arguing that humanitarian
intervention in response to massive human rights violations is valid exception to the general
inviolability of state sovereignty).
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unable to prevent.289 The doctrine has an ancient pedigree that predates
the more modern state-oriented theories of international law.2"
The British Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Sir Hartley Shawcross,
likened the exercise of the IMT's jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity to the historical right of humanitarian intervention:
Normally international law concedes that it is for the
state to decide how it shall treat its own nationals; it is a
matter of domestic jurisdiction .... Yet international
law has in the past made some claim that there is a limit
to the omnipotence of the State and that the individual
human being, the ultimate unit of all law, is not
disentitled to the protection of mankind when the state
tramples upon his rights in a manner which outrages the
conscience of mankind.... The same view was acted
upon by the European powers which in time past
intervened in order to protect the Christian subjects of
Turkey against cruel persecution. The fact is that the
right of humanitarian intervention by war is not a
novelty in international law-can intervention by
judicial process then be illegal? 29'
This analogy between humanitarian intervention and the prosecution of
crimes against humanity arose repeatedly in the post-World War II
289. See Yogesh K. Tyagim, The Concept ofHumanitarian Intervention, 16 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 883, 884 (1995) ("Te basis for a humanitarian intervention lies in the absence of a minimum
moral order in the whole or a part of a state, which is inconsistent with fundamental
humanitarian norms and unacceptable to other states or non-state entities."); Malvina
Halberstam, The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 1
(1995) (defining humanitarian intervention as "the use of force by one state in the territory of
another to protect persons who are in imminent danger of death or grave injury when the state
in whose territory they are is unwilling or unable to protect them").
290. Grotius argued in 1625 that a "war for the subjects of another [is] just, for the purpose
of defending them from injuries inflicted by their ruler... [if] a tyrant ... practices atrocities
toward his subjects which no just man can approve." Halberstam, supra note 290, at 3, quoting
HUGO GROTIUS, VINDICAE CONTRA TYRANNOS (1625). See also Lettre de M. Arntz, in Rolin
Jacuemyns, Note Sur la Thiorie de Droit d'Intervention, 8 REV. DROrr INT'LLEGIS. COMPARE
675 (1876), quoted in Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Vitality Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL W. INT'L L.J.
203, 220 (1974) ("[H]owever worthy of respect the rights of sovereignty and independence of
States may be, there is something even more worthy of respect, namely the law of humanity, or
of human society, that must not be violated. In the same way as within the State freedom of the
individual is and must be restricted by the law and the morals of the society, the individual
freedom of the States must be limited by the law of human society.") (emphasis in original);
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONALLAW 347 (1 st ed. 1905) ("[S]hould a State venture to treat
its own subjects or a part thereof with such cruelty as would stagger humanity, public opinion
of the rest of the world would call upon the Powers to exercise intervention for the purpose of
compelling such State to establish a legal order of things within its boundaries sufficient to
guarantee to its citizens an existence more adequate to the ideas of modem civilisation.").
291. Concluding Speeches by the Prosecution, 19 THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT
NUREMBERG, 433,471-72 (1948).
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proceedings. For example, in the Justice case, the tribunal observed that
the concept of crimes against humanity has its roots in humanitarian
intervention as it occurred in Turkey, Lebanon, Romania and Russia in
response to religious persecution.292 Similarly, in U.S. v. Goering, the
tribunal noted that "[t]he rights of humanitarian intervention on behalf
of the rights of man, trampled upon by a state in a manner shocking the
sense of mankind, has long been considered to form part of the
recognized law of nations. Here, too, the Charter merely develops a
preexisting principle.,2 93 Finally, the Prosecution in the Flick Case
argued in favor of the application of the crimes against humanity
provision to events occurring prior to the formal commencement of war
with reference to instances of humanitarian intervention throughout
history:
This doctrine that inhumane atrocities against civilian
populations are so contrary to the law of nations that a
country is rightfully entitled to interfere and endeavor to
put an end to them, by diplomatic protest or even by foe,
was repeatedly voiced and often acted upon during the
nineteenth century.29"
The Prosecution in that case concluded that while military intervention
in defense of victims of crimes against humanity is no longer an
appropriate sanction, "the fact that a particular method of enforcing law
and punishing crime has become outmoded does not mean that what
was previously a well-recognised crime at international law is such no
longer. ' 295 The Prosecution emphasized that the world community had
developed to such an extent that collective legal action along the lines
of the International Military Tribunal had become possible.296
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention suggests that the
existence of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population provides the hook on which international jurisdiction can
hang. It is unfortunate that the drafters of the IMT Charter were not
guided more by the protection of individuals at risk and less by the
desire to safeguard the principle of sovereignty at the expense of the
protection of basic human rights. The formulation chosen by the
drafters of the Statute for the permanent international criminal court
harkens back to this classic doctrine of humanitarian intervention and
emphasizes the principles that should properly guide the drafting of
international norms and the response to grave international crimes.
292. See United States v. Altstoetter, 3 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 981-82.
293. United States v. Goering, 3 CCL 10 TRIALS, supra note 4, at 92.
294. United States v. Flick, Opening Statement fortheProsecution, 6 CCL IOTRIAL,supra
note4, at 3,87-88. As support, theProsecution cited interventions in Greece, Turkey, Lebanon,
Russia, Romania, Syria and Cuba in defense of ethnic and religious minorities. See id. at 88-89.
295. Id. at 90.
296. See id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The history of the prohibition against crimes against humanity
has been characterized by a quest to identify an element of the offense
that serves to distinguish crimes against humanity from ordinary
municipal crimes. For the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter, which
was the first positive law articulation of the offense, the war nexus
requirement served this purpose. International lawyers soon realized,
however, that this element undesirably and illogically limited the scope
of the prohibition of crimes against humanity. Accordingly, they began
the search for an alternative mechanism to justify international
jurisdiction. The TadicTrial Chamber, with reference to the Justice and
Finta cases, significantly clarified the international law in this area with
its mens rea formulation. However, it further muddied the waters with
the addition of unnecessary motive elements that serve only to increase
the prosecution's burden of proof. As it resolves the appeal brought by
the Office of the Prosecutor in the Tadid case, the ICTY's Appeals
Chamber should reverse the Trial Chamber's ruling insofar as it attaches
motivational elements to the definition of crimes against humanity. It
should instead articulate a definition of crimes against humanity that
recognizes that the interplay between the two elements-the mens rea
of the defendant and the existence of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population-is sufficient to distinguish crimes against
humanity from ordinary crimes. The proceedings at the ICC Diplomatic
Conference should provide guidance to the Appeals Chamber in this
regard.
The achievement of a consensus definition of crimes against
humanity at the ICC Diplomatic Conference represents a significant
achievement for the international community and for the effort to
protect basic human rights worldwide. The convoluted path leading to
this point signifies the dramatic evolution that has occurred with respect
to the principles that guide the codification of international criminal law.
In particular, the ICC Statute's definition of crimes against humanity-a
definition based on the existence of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population and the perpetrator's knowing contribution
to that attack-marks the welcome culmination of a slow but steady
process of erosion of the significance of state sovereignty in the process
of international law formation.
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